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LIABILITY OF THE GUARANTOR OF SECURED INDEBTED-
NESS AFTER DEFAULT AND REPOSSESSION UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: A WALK ON THE WILD 
SIDE BY THE SECURED PARTY 
Rick Sachst and Gloria M. Belgradtt 
A lender who obtains security for and a guarantee of its loan 
may mistakenly presume that recovery in the event of the bor-
rower's default is assured. As the authors point out, however, 
numerous pitfaUs may await the unwary lender who attempts to 
secure repayment from the guarantor. This article identifies the 
problems involved, discusses their treatment by the courts, and 
makes recommendations for reducing the risks of costly 
mistakes. 
INTRODUCTION 
A commercial lender often seeks to assure repayment of the money 
it loans by taking a security interest in the business inventory, accounts 
receivable or other collateral of the borrowing company. In the 
commercial financing of small and medium-sized companies, it is 
common practice for the lender to seek additional assurances of 
repayment; the lender usually demands and obtains from the 
company's principals or third persons a guaranty of the indebtedness. 
Personal guarantees serve two inter-related purposes in the eyes of the 
lender: first, the personal guarantees represent an independent source 
of repayment of the indebtedness, so that if the company defaults in 
repayment, and the collateral in which the lender was granted a security 
interest proves inadequate to fully discharge the indebtedness, the 
lender can look to the personal resources of the guarantors for 
repayment; and, secondly, the lender can usually be assured that the 
guarantors will exert their best efforts in the operation of the business 
to liquidate the indebtedness so as to avoid personal liability . Yet, when 
a loan goes sour, the secured creditor who seeks to realize on the 
company's collateral and the personal guarantees must proceed with 
caution and on the most competent legal advice. In this post-default 
period, the creditor's actions, and, in some instances, failure to act, in 
respect of the debtor company, the collateral and the guarantors will 
determine whether the personal guarantees will, in fact, secure 
repayment of the company's indebtedness if the collateral and other 
company assets prove insufficient. 
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A number of threshhold questions immediately present themselves. 
May the secured party, upon default, simply repossess the collateral and 
peremptorily sell or otherwise dispose of it without notifying the 
debtor of the intended disposition? If notice is required, will notice to 
the direct borrower suffice, or is a guarantor entitled to separate 
notification as well? What type of notice is required to be given? What 
are the legal consequences, if any, of a failure to comply with the 
notice requirements? 
If the secured party does not wish to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
repossessed collateral, may it elect to retain the collateral in satisfaction 
of the debt? If the secured party elects to sell or otherwise dispose of 
only a part of the collateral and retain the rest, must it notify the 
defaulting debtor and the guarantor of its election? If the secured party 
wishes to defer a decision on the disposition of all or part of the 
collateral while observing the market, how long may it wait? What are 
the legal consequences of a protracted failure by the secured party to 
take any action with respect to the collateral? 
Subtitle Five of Title Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code 
[hereinafter referred to as the "UCC" or the "Code"] 1 governs the 
remedies of a secured party and the corresponding rights of the debtor 
and third persons with respect to the collateral upon default. A secured 
party's failure to comply with the provisions of the Code can prove to 
be a.very costly mistake. 
It is, the purpose of this article to explore, in the context of a typical 
secured transaction under the UCC, the answers to these questions that 
confront a lender-secured party who, upon default by the direct 
borrower, seeks to effect repayment of the indebtedness by holding the 
guarantors liable under their personal guarantees. 
F ACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Let us assume that a Maryland corporation [hereinafter referred to as 
the "Company" or the "Debtor"], engaged in the business of 
manufacturing and selling bricks, borrowed $500,000 [hereinafter 
re~erred to as the "Loan"] on January 1, 1973, from a Maryland 
lending institution [hereinafter referred to as the "Lender" or the 
"Secured Party"]. The Loan was evidenced by the Company's 
negotiable promissory note [hereinafter referred to as the "Note"] 
payable to the order of the Lender. The Note was secured by a security 
interest granted by the Company to the Lender by a duly executed 
written security agreement [hereinafter referred to as the "Security 
Agreement"] in all of the Company's existing and after-acquired brick 
inventory, accounts, and the proceeds thereof [hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the "Collateral"] . One or more financing statements were 
duly executed and filed. Repayment of the Loan and the performance 
1. See MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., §§ 9·501·07 (1975). 
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of all the Company's duties and obligations under the Security 
Agreement were personally guaranteed by an individual third party 
[hereinafter referred to as the "Guarantor"], who was not affiliated 
with the Company. 
A year later, the Company defaulted under the Security Agreement, 
and the Lender advised the Company that it was repossessing all of the 
Collateral. At the time of the Company's default, the Company's 
inventory consisted of 4,000,000 bricks, and the net total amount of its 
accounts receivable was $300,000. 
Two months after the default, the Lender gave written notice to the 
Company and the Guarantor that it proposed to dispose of the 
repossessed inventory at a public auction to be held at a designated 
time and place. The public auction was abortive; no bids were accepted 
and no sales consummated. 
Three months after the default, however, the Lender sold the 
repossessed brick inventory at a private sale for a total purchase price of 
$50,000. Although the Company was given prior oral notice of this 
private sale, neither oral nor written notice was given to the Guarantor. 
Furthermore, the Guarantor was given no notice of the Lender's 
intention to retain, sell or otherwise dispose of the repossessed accounts 
of the Company. For a period of eighteen months after default, the 
Lender collected, by lawsuit and otherwise, approximately $50,000 of 
the $300,000 net outstanding amount of the accounts; thereafter the 
Lender made no further collection efforts. 
Nineteen months after its default, the Company filed a voluntary 
petition in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland. The Lender then filed suit in federal court against 
the Guarantor on his guarantee of the Note and Security Agreement. 
On these facts, what, if any, problems will confront the Lender ip 
connection with its suit against the Guarantor? 
ANALYSIS 
1. The Notice Requirements 
The first potential barrier to the Lender's recovery is its failure to 
give notice to the Guarantor of its intent to sell the Collateral at the 
private sale. Although Section 9-504(1) of the Code permits a secured 
party, upon the borrower's default, to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose 
of any or all of the collateral .... ,"2 Section 9-504(3) places certain 
restrictions on the manner of the disposition. Among these is the 
requirement that the debtor be given reasonable notice of an intended 
sale. Section 9-504(3) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in 
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market 
2. [d. ~ 9-504(1). 
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reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale 
or reasonable notification of the time after which any private 
sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by 
the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of 
consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest 
in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement 
indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or who is known 
by the secured party to have a security interest in the 
collateral.3 
Since the Collateral in our hypothetical is neither "perishable" nor 
"threatens to decline speedily in value," and is not "of a type 
customarily sold on a recognized market,"4 the Secured Party was 
required under Section 9-504(3) to give prior notice of its intended 
private sale to the "debtor." The question then arises whether a 
guarantor is included within the meaning of the term "debtor" as that 
term is used in Section 9-504(3). 
A. Is a Guarantor a Debtor within the Meaning of Section 9-504(3) of 
the Code? 
An appreciation of the purpose of the notice requirements of 
Section 9-504(3) is essential to a determination of whether those 
requirements are applicable to a guarantor. It is almost universally 
agreed that the purpose of the Section 9-504( 3) notice requirements is 
to give "persons entitled to receive it... sufficient time to take 
appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or 
other disposition if they so desire."5 The holdings of the courts in cases 
involving the question of whether sufficient notice was given reflect this 
3. Id. § 9-504(3) (emphasis added). This Section also provides: 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may 
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a 
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of 
the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be 
commercially reasonable. Id. 
This article will not consider certain other defenses which might be available to the 
guarantor under the Code such as, the lack of commercial reasonableness in the sale of 
repossessed collateral. 
4. R-egarding collateral of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, Professor 
Gilmore has stated: 
No one would question that the New York Stock Exchange is a "recognized 
market" for securities listed on the Exchange .... Evidently there is no "market" 
unless it is possible to say, with objective truth, at 2:00 p.m. on February 3 the 
market price for steel, soybeans or whatnot was X .... If the statement could not 
be made ... [there J would not be a "market", so that it would be unnecessary to 
speculate about whether, if it was a "market," it would be "recognized" one. 2 G. 
GILMORE, Security Interests in Personal Property § 44.5, at 1236 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE J. 
See also Norton v. Nat') Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143,398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). 
5. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-504, Comment 5 (1975). 
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view. In Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance and Loan Corp. ,6 for example, 
the secured creditor had actually mailed the required prior notice, but 
the letter had come back marked "unclaimed" prior to the sale. The 
court held that the prior notice requirements of the Code had not been 
satisfied, stating: 
The purpose of this notice, without doubt, is to enable the 
debtor to protect his interest in the property by paying the 
debt, finding a buyer or being present at the sale to bid on the 
property or have others do so, to the end that it be not 
sacrificed by a sale at less than its true value. 
The requirement of notice is for the benefit and protection 
of the debtor. This provision of the Act should be construed 
and applied in a manner to effectuate this salutary 
purpose .... 7 
In Aimonetto v. Keepes, 8 the creditor claimed that, as a result of his 
conversations with the debtor concerning the need to sell the collateral 
to satisfy the debt, the debtor had received "constructive notice" of the 
creditor's intentions prior to the time of the actual private sale. The 
Wyoming court rejected this contention, stating, "[ t] he law requires 
more than a reasonable expectation on the part of the debtor if the 
notice requirement of the commercial code is to be satisfied."9 For 
similar reasons, the court in The Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson,10 held 
that even the creditor's advertisement of the sale, coupled with 
informal notification to the defendants, was insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Section 9-504(3).11 
In Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan of Henderson, Inc., 12 in 
which the defendant debtor had actually returned the collateral to the 
creditor and instructed the creditor to sell it, the court refused to hold 
that the debtor had been given adequate notice (although the court 
found it either had waived the right to notice or was estopped from 
claiming damages resulting from the lender's failure to give notice). The 
court said: 
6. 57 Tenn. App. 106,415 S.W.2d 347 (1966). 
7. Id. at 112·13, 415 S.W.2d at 350·51 (emphasis added). See also Commercial Credit Corp. 
v. Lloyd, 12 VCC REP. 15 (D.C. Super. Ct, Small Cl. and Conciliation Br. 1973). 
8. 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972). 
9. Id. at 1019. 
10. 133 Ill. App. 2d 717, 271 N.E.2d 404 (1971). 
11. The court stated: 
It is true that the sale was advertised and that the defendants should have 
expected such action on the part of the plaintiff since the record discloses that 
plaintiff had advised the defendants of its intentions to effect a sale, but the law 
requires more than a general advertisement or a reasonable expectation on the 
part of the debtor if the notice requirement is to be satisfied. Id. at 720, 271 
N.E.2d at 407. 
12. 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). 
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The debtor is entitled to notification of a specific date after 
which the creditor may proceed to dispose of the collateral. 
This would give the debtor a deadline within which to protect 
himself in whatever manner he saw fit. Knowledge would be 
brought home to him that if he failed to liquidate his 
indebtedness, or reach an agreement with respect to the 
collateral, or failed to take other appropriate action by a 
specified time, he would be foreclosed from attacking the 
subsequent sale (provided always that it was "commercially 
reasonable"). 13 
Actual notification has been held insufficient when it was not given 
within a reasonable time prior to the sale. In Cities Service Oil Co. v. 
Ferris,14 the court found that the plaintiff creditor had "fulfilled his 
bare statutory duty"IS under the Code by giving a form of prior notice 
to the debtor, but the court held that "the commercial code requires 
more.,,16 The defendant debtor in Ferris learned of the intended sale 
only at 10:30 a.m. on the morning of sale. The court explained its 
finding that the defendant did not receive reasonable notification as 
follows: 
Had the defendants had more time, when they knew foreclosure 
was inevitable, they could have perhaps contacted the retail 
outlets of the plaintiffs and notified them of the sale in order 
that these individuals could be present to bid in whatever 
parcels of the collateral they might wish to purchase. 
Admittedly, the court is dealing in a presumption that the retail 
dealers of the plaintiff would have been interested in purchasing 
some of the items. However in view of the short notice, the 
plaintiff must permit the court to indulge in this 
presumption.17 
The unmistakable thrust of the opinions is that the debtor must be 
given the opportunity, by whatever means are available to it in the 
circumstances, of eliminating altogether or, at least, reducing to a 
minimum, the amount of any deficiency for which it might be liable. 
A concern with preserving the debtor's right under Section 9-506 to 
redeem the collateral "[a]t any time before the secured party has 
disposed of [it] or entered into a contract for its disposition .... " is 
also implicit in the decisions. Sometimes, as in the case of Skeels v. 
13. Id. at 377. 
14. 9 uee REP. 899 (D.C. Mich. 1971). 
15. Id. at 903. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 902. 
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Universal C.l. T. 'Credit Corp., 18 the two purposes appear to be ranked 
of equal importance. There the court stated: 
The owner should have an opportunity to bid at the sale. It was 
the secret disposition of collateral by chattel mortgage owners 
and others which was an evil which the Code sought to 
correct. . .. A security holder who disposes of collateral 
without notice denies to the debtor his right of redemption 
which is provided him in Section 9-506 .... 19 
As Mallicoat, Ferris and Skeels indicate, a debtor who is unable to 
redeem may yet protect its interests in the collateral by bidding at the 
sale to drive up the level of competing bids or by "drumming up" 
interest in the sale. Failing all else, it can at least be present to 
determine whether the secured party is proceeding in accordance with 
the requirement of the Code that "every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms... be 
commercially reasonable.' ,20 
Thus, it is perhaps more precise to say that the purpose of the notice 
requirements of VCC Section 9-504(3) is a dual one: to preserve to the 
debtor its right to redeem the collateral and to give it time to exert 
efforts to reduce the likelihood and size of any possible deficiency by 
whatever means available. 
The draftsmen of the Code deemed these purposes of the prior 
notice requirements of Section 9-504(3) to be so fundamentally and 
vitally important that they departed from their avowed devotion to 
freedom of contract principles21 and provided, in Section 9-501(3), 
that the rights of the debtor to prior notice under Section 9-504(3) 
may not be waived or varied prior to the default.22 This protective 
reasoning of the Code draftsmen is also exhibited in the requirement of 
18.222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
19. Id. at 702. See also Camden Nat'l. Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973). 
20. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9·504(3) (1975). 
21. Mo; ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9·101, Comment (1975), provides: 
Except for procedure on default, freedom of contract prevails between the 
immediate parties to the security transaction. 
22. The Official Comment explains the concern of the draftsmen: 
In general, provisions which relate to matters which come up between immediate 
parties may be varied by agreement. In the area of rights after default our legal 
system has traditionally looked with suspicion on agreements designed to cut 
down the debtor's rights and free the secured party of his duties: no mortgage 
clause has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption. The default 
situation offers great scope for overreaching; the suspicious attitude of the courts 
has been grounded in common sense. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9·501, 
Comment 4 (1975). 
See, e.g., ·C.LT. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (1965) (secured 
party's sale, without notice, pursuant to debtor's antecedent waiver of notice of resale of 
repossessed collateral is void as against public policy of protecting "improvident and 
impecunious" debtors from unfair dealing and imposition, and of preserving the debtor's 
long·established right of redemption). But see note 127 infra and accompanying text. 
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Section 9-504(3) that "except in the case of consumer goods," the 
secured party must give prior notice of disposition "to any person who 
has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a 
financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or 
who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the 
collateral. ,,23 
It is evident from the importance ascribed to them by the draftsmen 
of the Code, and from the solicitude with which they are treated by the 
courts, that these prior notice requirements lie at the heart of a social 
and economic policy that embraces more than vindication of the 
merely technical rights of individual defaulting debtors. The secured 
party's compliance with these notice provisions, together with the other 
procedures for disposition of collateral upon default is clearly deemed 
to be vital "for the protection not only of the defaulting debtor but of 
other creditors" as well.24 Like the defaulting debtor, the holder of a 
junior security interest, for example, has vital interests in the 
repossessed collateral which can be similarly safeguarded. It may be 
willing and able to redeem the collateral or procure interested buyers to 
drive up the level of competitive bidding at the sale or, at the very least, 
scrutinize the conduct of the sale for indicia of unfairness or 
commercial unreasonableness. Aside from equitable considerations, it is 
virtually indispensable to the rational functioning of the entire 
regulatory scheme envisaged by Article Nine of the vce that some 
mechanism be provided, whereby, without unduly burdening the 
secured party, those with the closest and most substantial interests in 
the collateral can be provided with the opportunity to protect these 
interests. In the case of these designated creditors, this function is 
served by the prior notice mandate of vce Section 9-504(3). 
The same policy considerations would· seem to apply with equal 
force to the owner of collateral who merely permits his property to be 
"pledged" by another as security for the latter's debt. Pursuant to 
Section 9-112, an owner of collateral is immune from the threat of 
liability "for the debt or for any deficiency after resale" that hangs over 
the individual actually indebted in the secured transaction. Yet, while 
the owner's interest in the collateral is readily distinguishable from that 
of a junior secured creditor, its interest is, nevertheless, sufficiently 
close and substantial to be embraced within the protective prior notice 
mandate of vec Section 9-504(3). This conclusion is reached indi-
rectly; one searches in vain for any express reference to the owner of 
the collateral in Section 9-504. However, the definitional cross refer-
ence appended to the Official Comment to Section 9-504 directs 
attention to Section 9-105 for the meaning and scope of the term 
"debtor," as that term is employed within the context of Section 
9-504. Section 9-105(1)(d) provides, in pertinent part, that: . 
23. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-504(3) (1975) (emphasis added). 
24. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-501, Comment 1 (1975). 
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"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other 
performance of the obligation secured. . . . Where the debtor 
and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the 
term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any 
provision of the [Article] dealing with the collateral, the 
obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may 
include both where the context so requires.25 
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Since a section dealing with disposition of collateral upon default is, 
manifestly, a "provision of the [Article] dealing with the collateral," 
the conclusion is irresistible that the owner of the collateral is a 
"debtor" entitled to notice within the meaning of Section 9-504(3). 
Section 9-504(3) is as devoid of any reference to a guarantor as it is 
of any reference to an owner of collateral. Guidance on this point must 
again be sought in the definition of "debtor" as set forth· in 
Section 9-105(1)(d). The language of that Section providing that 
"debtor" means the person "who owes payment or other performance 
of the obligation secured . ... "26 can be readily construed to embrace 
a guarantor. This is particularly true of a guarantor who, like the one in 
our hypothetical, guarantees not only repayment of the indebtedness 
under the note, but also performance of the obligations and duties of 
the debtor under the security agreement, and, therefore, patently owes 
the secured party "payment or other performance of the obligation 
secured" within the meaning of Section 9-105(1)(d). The very measure 
of that payment or other performance due the secured party hinges 
upon the secured party's disposition of the repossessed collateral after 
default. A closer and more substantial interest in the collateral is hard 
to imagine. To read Section 9-105 as including within the definition of 
"debtor" an owner of collateral who owes no payment or other 
performance whatsoever, but excluding the guarantor with all of its 
exposure to a deficiency judgment, would appear to be extremely 
arbitrary and capricious. It would certainly be at variance with the 
cautionary advice of the draftsmen of Article Nine that "[t]he scheme 
of the [Article] is to make distinctions, where distinctions are 
necessary, along functional rather than formal lines. ,,27 
The question of whether the guarantor of secured indebtedness, or 
someone in a closely analogous position, is a "debtor" entitled to 
notice within the meaning of Section 9-504(3) has rarely arisen in the 
25. See, e.g., Kripke and Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions: A Practical Approach to Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUT. L. REv. 168 (1962), who state: 
As Article 9 is concerned with the treatment of security, it affects owners of 
collateral whether or not they have personal liability on the obligation secured. 
For convenience, Article 9 defines "debtor" as both the individual personally 
liable and the owner of the collateral, where they are different. In this way, 
Article 9 prescribes the rules relating to collateral for a debt, regardless of who 
owns the collateral. Id. at 169. 
26. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9·105(1)(d) (1975) (emphasis added). 
27. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-101, Comment (1975) (emphasis added). 
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reported decisions. On those scant occasions when the courts have been 
called upon to consider the question, however, they have answered it in 
the affirmative. 
A leading case in this area is Norton v. National Bank of 
Commerce.28 Norton, an automobile dealer, sold a used car to 
Goldsmith, who executed a promissory note and a conditional sales 
contract for the unpaid purchase price. Norton sold the note and 
contract to the plaintiff bank, endorsing the note and executing a 
written assignment of the contract, which provided that if Goldsmith 
should default in his obligation Norton would repurchase the contract 
for the amount due. Goldsmith shortly defaulted, the bank repossessed 
the car, and, without notice to either Goldsmith or Norton, sold the car 
to one of its customers in a private sale. The proceeds of sale were 
insufficient to wipe out the debt, and when Norton refused the bank's 
demand for payment of the outstanding balance, the bank brought suit 
against him to recover a deficiency judgment. On these facts, the court 
held that "Norton was a debtor ... entitled to notice that a private sale 
was impending,,,29 explaining that: 
the controlling definition appears in [Section 9-105 
(l)(d)], ... 
Norton had promised to repurchase the contract for the 
amount due. He was a person who owed "other performance" 
of the obligation.30 
It is also significant that the court arrived at this conclusion only 
after weighing and rejecting narrow conceptual distinctions urged upon 
it in amicus curiae briefs submitted at its own request. Clearly adopting 
the functional approach intended by the VCC, the court stated: 
Norton ... was directly affected by the sale of the [repossessed 
collateral] ; the amount obtained in that sale fixed his pecuniary 
liability. In simple fairness he should have had notice-a 
requirement entailing no real inconvenience or hardship to the 
bank.31 
The same functional approach led the court in T& W ICe Cream, Inc. 
v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 32 to hold that the accommodation endorsers of a 
corporate note secured by a security interest in furniture and 
equipment used in the corporate debtor's business were "debtors" 
within the meaning of Section 9-105(1)(d) and, as such, entitled to 
prior notice of a private sale under VCC Section 9-504(3): 
28. 240 Ark. 143,398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). 
29. [d. at 145, 398 S.W.2d at 540. 
30. [d. at 14647,398 S.W.2d at 540. 
31. [d. at 148,398 S.W.2d at 541. 
32. 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969). 
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The exact words of the guarantee signed by the individual 
guarantors in the security agreement between. Carriage Barn and 
plaintiff's assignors was [sic.] : "Payment and performance of 
the above obligation absolutely, unconditionally and continu-
ously guaranteed." 
This language of, the guarantee is almost exactly the same as 
that of the definition of a debtor (a debtor being a person who 
"owes payment or other performance of the obligation se-
cured"). Therefore, the court finds that the accommodation 
endorsers in this case are debtors under [Section] 9-105(I)(d) 
and are thus entitled to notice.33 
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Significantly, the court observed that the secured party was "in 
effect" proceeding against the individual guarantors ·after the default of 
the corporate debtor.34 By virtue of the ubiquitous acceleration clause, 
default typically converts the guarantor's theretofore contingent 
liability into a direct and primary liability for full performance of the 
entire secured obligation. When the secured party is confident that the 
value of the collateral equals or exceeds the amount of the debt, or that 
the defaulting debtor can secure new financing, it is likely to regard the 
additional security of the guarantee as largely superfluous. When the 
probability of a deficiency looms, the situation is altered sharply: the 
guarantor will appear to be a much safer "bet" for payment than the 
insolvent or "defunct" original debtor. This is particularly likely to be 
the case when the language of the guarantee is highly reassuring to the 
secured party, that is, when absolute and unconditional payment or 
other performance is guaranteed in language which "is almost exactly 
the same as that of the definition of a debtor."35 The guarantor, in 
short, is likely to be made the real target of the secured party's 
anticipated collection efforts. The sale will merely fix the exact amount 
of its pecuniary liability. Thus, in a very real sense, when the secured 
party prepares to dispose of the collateral by sale, it is taking the first 
step toward ultimate recovery under the guarantee, and is, in effect 
proceeding against the guarantor rather than against the original debtor. 
It can be argued strongly that the secured party, who is taking comfort 
in its foresight in obtaining additional security, should not be permitted 
to deny that the very 'individual to whom it looks foremost for 
payment or other performance is, in fact, its debtor, and, as such, 
entitled to all of the procedural and other safeguards provided for 
debtors in the Code. 
This type of assessment of the underlying realities of the commercial 
situation apparently led the court in Third National Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Stagnaro 36 to hold that, since the maker of a corporate note secured 
33. Id. at 332·33, 258 A.2d at 165. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. 25 Mass. App. Dec. 58 (1962). 
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by a chattel mortgage had dishonored it, the president of the debtor 
corporation, who had endorsed the note, was a debtor within the 
meaning of VCC Section 9-504(3).37 
This functional approach has also been followed when the issue of 
prior notice has been raised in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. 
In In re Frye,38 for example, the court concluded that the trustee in 
bankruptcy was the debtor "under the statutory definition of ... VCC 
9-105(1)(d) .... "39 and, therefore, entitled to notice of any intended 
disposition. Curiously, neither the trustee nor the secured party made 
any reference to Section 9-105(1)(d), but the court, indicating that the 
"language of this section ... [threw] considerable light,,40 on the 
issue, turned to it sua sponte. 
Two apparently contrary cases do not, upon close analysis, lend 
themselves as strong precedential authority for the proposition that a 
guarantor should not be treated as a debtor under Section 9-504(3). In 
A. J. Armstrong Co., Inc. u. Janburt Embroidery Corp.,41 the court 
held that the accommodation endorsers of the debtor corporation's 
note were personally liable for a deficiency judgment. The issue of 
37. Id. at 66. The court went on to find, however, that the collateral there sold was a type 
customarily sold on a recognized market so as to bring the plaintiff bank within the 
exception to the notice requirements of Section 9-504(3). The court further found that, 
from undisputed evidence in the case, the defendant actually had received a letter of 
notice addressed to the corporation but flagged to his attention. Substance similarly 
prevailed over form in Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
315 (1972). In that case, it was conceded that the defendant, who had orally assured the 
plaintiff loan company that he was backing the primary debtor and was a silent partner 
in the latter's business, was a "debtor" within the meaning of UCC Section 9-105(1)(d) 
and, therefore, entitled to notice under UCC Section 9-504(3). 
See also Foundation Discounts Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970), 
which, although not strictly decided on the basis of the Code, contains persuasive dicta 
in support of the proposition that a guarantor is a debtor under 9-504(3). 
38. 9 UCC REP. 913 (S.D. Ohio 1970). 
39. [d. at 919. 
40. [d. at 918. It should be noted that the court in Frye did not rest its conclusion upon the 
technical consideration that, by virtue of the "relation back" doctrine, title to the 
automobile had vested in the trustee prior to the sale so that the trustee was an 
owner-of-collateral-debtor within the meaning of Section 9-105(1)(d). The court 
summarily dismissed the argument as follows: 
These statutory duties and interests of the trustee in bankruptcy are not relevant 
to the issues raised on a purely functional basis. It must be emphasized that the 
Uniform Commercial Code very properly, and expressly, incorporates all of "the 
principles of law and equity, ... " as a supplement to its provisions .... [UCC 
Section 1-103]. Any right or obligation declared in the Uniform Commercial 
Code is enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a different 
and limited effect. [d. at 920. 
Cf. In re Senters,9 UCC REP. 922 (S.D. Ohio 1970), which provides an interesting 
and illuminating example of how a court's evenhanded concern with commercial realities 
and with commercial fairness rather than with formal and technical distinctions, can 
work to the advantage of the secured party rather than that of the debtor. Although the 
court held that the trustee was not a debtor entitled to notice, its expressed concern with 
functional results fairly implies that upon a proper showing of facts, the court would 
treat the "additional monetary loss" potentially visited on a guarantor deprived of notice 
of disposition with no less solicitude than was shown to the secured party therein, 
threatened with losses by virtue of a delayed sale. 
41. 97 N.J. Super. 246, 234 A.2d 737 (1967). 
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notice to the defendants appeared to be raised, almost as an 
afterthought, as one element of one of several defenses asserted. The 
court devoted only a single sentence in the entire lengthy opinion to 
this subject, stating: "Section 9-504(3) provides that only the debtor 
[the corporate maker of the note] or other secured party need receive 
notice. ,,42 The statement was totally unsupported by citation of 
authority. Significantly, a later decision from the same jurisdiction, 
T& W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc. ,43 distinguished and refused 
to follow the Janburt case. 
The holding of the other case, Mutual Finance Co. v. Politzer,44 that 
the guarantors of a secured corporate debt were liable for a deficiency, 
is difficult to apply to our hypothetical factual scenario for numerous 
reasons. First, the thrust of the defendants' argument was that they, as 
guarantors, were discharged by virtue of the plaintiff's failure to give 
notice to and consequent discharge of their principal, the corporate 
debtor. Secondly, in Politzer the guarantors were a husband, his wife 
and his mother, who had individually executed guarantees on behalf of 
the corporation in which the husband was the sole stockholder. 
Inasmuch as the guarantors represented the total ownership interest in 
the closely held corporation, the holding of the court may have been 
motivated by the conviction that they should be liable for the 
corporation's debt. Thirdly, there were strong estoppel facts in Politzer 
based on an agreement between the guarantors and the plaintiff after 
repossession which induced the plaintiff to resell the collateral without 
giving the debtor the required notice. Fourthly, the decision was largely 
based on technical distinctions between the liability of sureties and that 
of guarantors, which are frowned upon by the VCC. It is arguable, 
therefore, that Politzer has no application beyond similarly narrow 
factual situations.45 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the authorities and the 
relevant underlying policy considerations, a secured party would be 
best advised to deem a guarantor a "debtor" within the meaning of 
Section 9-504(3), entitled to notice of the intended disposition of 
repossessed collateral. To require a secured party to give notice of 
disposition to a guarantor of the indebtedness secured is "a requirement 
entailing no real inconvenience or hardship to the [secured party] ." 46 
This requirement would seem incomparably less burdensome than the 
requirement to give notice to other secured creditors designated in 
42. [d. at 263, 234 A.2d at 746. But see Camden Nat1 Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 
1973), in which an accommodation maker of a notice was deemed to be entitled to 
notice. 
43. 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969). 
44. 21 Ohio St. 2d 177,50 Ohio Op. 2d 397, 256 N.E.2d 606 (1970), aff'g 16 Ohio App. 2d 
83, 241 N.E.2d 906 (1968). 
45. For a discussion highly critical of the decision in Politzer, see 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
874 (1969). 
46. Norton v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 148,398 S.W.2d 538,541 (1966). 
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Section 9-504(3);47 the secured party need not be put to the trouble of 
searching through various state records, since the identity of its 
guarantor is already known and available from its own files. In view of 
the guarantor's serious and substantial interests in the sale of the 
collateral, it would seem little enough to demand that the secured party 
be required to provide the guarantor with reasonable prior notice 
thereof. 
Assuming, therefore, that the Guarantor in our hypothetical was a 
debtor entitled to notice of disposition under Section 9-504(3), the 
next issue that must be examined is the effect, if any, of the Lender's 
failure to give prior notice upon its right to recover a deficiency 
judgment against the Guarantor.· 
B. The Effect of Failure to Give Notice on the Secured Party's Right to 
Recover a Deficiency Judgment 
A majority of the courts [hereinafter referred to as the "Majority"] 
that have considered the problem of the secured party's non-com-
pliance with the default provisions of the vee have concluded that 
non-compliance extinguishes the secured party's right to recover a 
deficiency as a matter of law. This view has also attracted considerable 
support from the textual commentators and authors of articles on the 
subject}8 
A number of other jurisdictions [hereinafter referred to as the 
"Minority"], however, have adopted the rule that lack of notice is not 
an absolute defense to a suit for recovery of a deficiency. Apparently, 
the courts that have reached this conclusion have felt impelled to it 
more by their superficial reading of the statutory language of the 
47. See text of Section 9·504(3) at note 3 supra. 
48. Professor Gilmore, for example, describes this result as "eminently reasonable." 2 
GILMORE § 44.9.10, at 1264 (1965). See White, Representing the Low Income Consumer 
in Repossessions, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808 (1970), 
who states: 
In sum, the weight of authority may well be that the failure to comply with Part 5 
of Article 9 precludes a creditor's recovery of a deficiency .... None of the cases 
which are cited for the proposition that a misbehaving creditor retains a right to a 
deficiency is strong authority .... [The cases which deny recovery] constitute a 
body of case law which is enjoying both rapid growth and acceptance. Moreover, 
there is every indication that this doctrine can be successfully cultivated in all but 
the most barren judicial soil. Id. at 832-33. 
See, e.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to 
the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 U. ORE. L. REV. 302, 317 (1972); 
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and 
ReSale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969); Comment, Defending Deficiency Judgment Suits in 
Kentucky: Article Nine, Part 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 61 Ky. L.J. 578, 588 
(1973). 
A similar growing concern with the possibilities for creditors' abuse of the 
deficiency decree appears to be invading the ranks of the lawmakers; for example, 
legislatures in a number of states, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming, have passed some form of 
supplementary anti-deficiency judgment legislation. 
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default prOVISIOns than by any firm conviction as to its wisdom and 
desirability. This is evidenced by the fact that these courts have made 
strenuous judicial efforts ... to mitigate [the] harsh and unfair 
consequences [to the debtor that may result from this 
approach]. The most common formula was to create a 
presumption that the value of the repossessed [collateral] had 
the value of the outstanding debt and to place upon the secured 
party the burden of proving a different value.49 
1. The Majority Rule Cases 
The courts holding that creditor compliance with the default 
provisions of Article Nine is a prerequisite to recovery of a deficiency 
judgment have taken a variety of routes, both legal and equitable, to 
arrive at that decision. 
The case of Leaseo Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Shirt 
Co. ,so is, perhaps, the most incisive and lucid of all of the cases barring 
recovery of a deficiency for failure to give notice. Three aspects of the 
court's opinion are worthy of preliminary comment. First, the court 
denied recovery solely and exclusively on the basis of the creditor's 
failure to give notice; there were no other infractions of the rules, no 
other indications of commercial unreasonableness to cloud the issue or 
deflect attention from the court's clear holding.s1 Secondly, the court 
went to special pains to articulate the basis for its opinion, not merely 
because "of the importance of the question"s2 but because a split of 
authority in the only three reported New York cases involving the 
question appeared to make "a careful examination of the problem ... 
appropriate."S3 The court's reasoning is thus fully open to scrutiny. 
Thirdly, in formulating its opinion, the court had the benefit of ample 
precedent from other jurisdictions. It had closely examined contrary 
decisions so that its rejection of their authority and persuasiveness must 
be seen as both well-informed and deliberate. 
The background facts in Leaseo were, by the court's own descrip-
tion, "both simple and familiar."s4 The defendant defaulted on a 
secured transaction involving a lease-with-reservations-of-title to certain 
49. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1093, 323 
N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). 
50. 66 Misc. 2d 1089,323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). 
51. [d. at 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The creditor solicited bids on the collateral from 
dealers, sold it for the highest of the three bids received, and apparently was not the 
actual purchaser at his own sale so as to raise implications of overreaching. There was 
uncontroverted evidence in the case from which the court found as a fact that the price 
received at the sale was the fair market value of the equipment at that time. The issue of 
lack of notice was thus presented for decision in stark relief. 
52. [d. at 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 14. 
53. [d. Two New York cases had barred recovery: Jefferson City Credit Corp. v. Marcono, 60 
Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969) and Associates Discount Corp. v. 
Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1965) . 
. 54. 66 Misc. 2d 1089,323 N.Y.S.2d 14. 
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equipment. The entire outstanding balance of the debt became due 
under an acceleration clause. The secured party repossessed the 
equipment and sold it at private sale without giving any prior notice to 
the debtor. In the subsequent suit to recover a deficiency judgment, the 
court held that the secured creditor's recovery was barred as a matter of 
law. 
The creditor in Leaseo raised the statutory construction argument 
that provides the real impetus to the standard Minority rationale; 
namely that, inasmuch as Section 9-504(3) does not expressly preclude 
recovery of a deficiency for non-compliance with its notice provisions, 
the right to recover a deficiency is limited only by the remedies set 
forth in Section 9-507; that is, that non-compliance cannot be used as 
an absolute defense, since Section 9-507 constitutes the debtor's 
exclusive remedy for secured creditor non-compliance. 
Section 9-507(1) provides as follows: 
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in 
accordance with the provisions of this [Part] disposition may 
be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If 
the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled 
to notification or whose security interest has been made known 
to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to 
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this [Part] .55 
The court quickly exposed what it considered the threshold incon-
sistency in the creditor's position-that if there is no express bar to a 
deficiency judgment in Section 9-504(3) neither is there any mention in 
Section 9-507 of "the circumstances under which a right to a deficiency 
may arise. ,,56 The words "exclusive remedy" are absent from the text 
of either Section and neither Section expressly sanctions a presumption 
of any kind. As the Leaseo court readily perceived, the absence of an 
express sanction for either approach does not call for hasty or 
superficial conclusions; it merely warrants a more detailed textual 
analysis of the relevant statutory provisions in order to ascertain the 
true intent of the draftsmen in light of the purpose, policy and history 
of the default provisions of the DeC. The court proceeded to undertake 
a more thorough analysis of the statutory language than is to be found 
in any of the other cases that have considered this question. 
The court began by indicating that a natural and unrestrained reading 
of Section 9-504(3) must lead to the conclusion that creditor com-
pliance with the notice provisions of that Section is a condition 
precedent to recovery of a deficiency judgment: 
55. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9·507(1} (1975). 
56. 66 Misc. 2d at 1091,323 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
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It surely has meaning that the very section that affirms the right 
to a deficiency judgment after sale of a repossessed article also 
describes in simple and practical terms the rules governing 
dispositions as well as the pertinent notice requirements. If a 
secured creditor's right to a deficiency judgment were intended 
to be independent of compliance with those rules, one would 
surely expect that unusual concept to be delineated with 
clarity. The natural inference that the right depends upon 
compliance is forcefully underlined by the joining of the two 
provisions in one section. 57 
169 
If creditor compliance is not a condition precedent, and the 
creditor's right to recover a deficiency is limited only by the remedies 
provided for the debtor in Section 9-507, then the language of 
Section 9-507 should be reasonably appropriate to, and consistent with 
the purpose of establishing a defense to the deficiency action. The 
Leasco court pointed out, however, that Section 9-507 speaks only in 
terms of an affirmative action against the creditor to recover damages; 
it does not sound in defense at all: 
More significant is the special nature of the language used: "the 
debtor or any person entitled to notification ... has a right to 
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this Part." If this were intended 
to authorize a defense to an action for a deficiency judgment it 
is hard to envisage language less apt to that purpose. The words 
used plainly contemplate an affirmative action to recover for a 
loss that has already been sustained-not a defense to an action 
for a deficiency. The distinction between an affirmative action 
and a defense is a familiar one, phrases that articulate the 
different concepts are familiar in the law, and it is unlikely that 
the experienced authors of the V.C.C. intended the above 
language to provide a limited defense to an action for a 
deficiency judgment based on a sale that had violated the simple 
and flexible statutory procedure.58 
The court, therefore, concluded that: 
It seems far more probable that [Section 9-507] has nothing 
whatever to do with defenses to an action for a deficiency, since 
it was never contemplated that a secured party could recover 
such a judgment after violating the statutory command as to 
notice. 59 
57. [d. (emphasis added). 
58. [d. at 1092, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
59. [d. 
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The Leasco court then indicated that, quite apart from textual 
analysis of the relevant sections of the UCC, the same conclusion 
appeared to be dictated by judicial experience with similar provisions of 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act [hereinafter referred to as the 
"UCSA"], one of the statutory predecessors of the UCC. As Professor 
Gilmore has expressed it, the UCSA "treated the question of the 
buyer's liability for a deficiency and the seller's liability for failure to 
comply with the resale requirements in a sequence of sections which is 
almost exactly comparable with the sequence of [Section] 9-504(2) 
and [Section] 9-507(1)."60 Section 19 of the UCSA required that 
notice of an intended resale be published in a newspaper for five days 
prior to the sale.61 Section 22 of the UCSA provided that: "If the 
proceeds of the resale are not sufficient to defray the expenses 
thereof ... and the balance due upon the purchase price, the seller may 
recover the deficiency from the buyer or from anyone who has 
succeeded to the obligations of the buyer.,,62 Section 25 of the UCSA 
provided that: 
If the seller fails to comply with the [resale] provisions [of the 
Act] ... the buyer may recover from the seller his actual 
damages, if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum 
of all payments which have been made under the contract, with 
interest.63 
Almost without exception, the courts held that a creditor's compliance 
with these resale provisions of the UCSA was a condition precedent to 
his recovery of a deficiency judgment.64 
Despite the fact that the sections of the UCC dealing with disposition 
of repossessed collateral have altered the UCSA in a number of ways 
and are substantially more flexible than those of the older act, the 
significance of a nearly-uniform judicial response to the UCSA sections 
was not lost on the Leasco court: 
This rule [barring recovery of a deficiency for non-compliance] 
was adopted even though (1), the statutory language did not 
specifically link the right to secure a deficiency judgment with 
such notice and (2) [Section 25] specifically declared the 
debtor's right to recover actual damages in the event of a 
violation of the sections regulating sale and notice of sale. 
If the authors of the [UCC] proposed to overthrow the 
firmly established and generally accepted construction of the 
60. GILMORE § 44.9.4, at 1262 (1965). 
61. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19 (repealed 1964). 
62. Id., § 22 (repealed 1964). 
63. Id., § 25 (repealed 1964). 
64. See, e.g., 49 A.L.R.2d 15, 82 (1956). 
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older statute denying recovery for a deficiency where there was 
not precise compliance with the notice requirement, they surely 
would have manifested that intent in clear and unambiguous 
language. In fact, there is not the slightest intimation of any 
such purpose to be found in the [vee]. The conclusion is 
inescapable that the prior interpretation continues to be 
applicable under the [Vee] .... 65 
Professor Gilmore makes precisely the same point, stressing that: 
It would have been quite as possible to conclude that the seller's 
recovery under [Section] 22 and the buyer's recovery under 
[Section] 25 were offsetting claims as it would be to make the 
same argument under the comparable Article 9 provisions. 
Nevertheless, the courts, with only a few exceptions, held that a 
literal compliance with the complicated VeSA resale provisions 
was a condition precedent to the seller's recovery of a 
deficiency.66 
171 
Finally, the court in the Leaseo case gave its assessment of the 
persuasiveness of the Minority rule opinions which it had studied. It 
found them wanting in at least three major respects: (1) none 
undertook "a detailed textual analysis of the relevant statutory 
language;,,67 (2) none referred to the "settled interpretation of the 
corresponding provisions of the [VeSA]" nor "describe[d] how it had 
been changed by the new statutory language,,68 and (3) all of the 
opinions were forced to devise fictional presumptions in order to 
mitigate the "harsh and unfair consequences,,69 of their holdings, when 
these consequences could be eliminated without resort to artificial 
contrivances if a more direct and forthright approach to the funda-
mental question of liability in the absence of notice were taken. As the 
court forcefully put it: 
I am persuaded that this kind of judicial fiction is not necessary 
to reach a sensible and fair result. The most natural construc-
tion of the statutory language, the legal background, the 
realities of the relationships between secured creditors and 
debtors who have defaulted and their respective resources for 
prosecuting lawsuits, all point unmistakably to .the conclusion 
that the right to a deficiency judgment depends on compliance 
with the statutory requirements concerning dispositions and 
notice. 
65. 66 Misc. 2d at 1090-91, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16 (footnotes omitted). 
66. GILMORE § 44.9.4, at 1263 (1965). 
67. 66 Misc. 2d at 1092,323 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 1093, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
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The burden on the secured creditor is by no means onerous. 
If he wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey the law, the 
relevant provisions of which are now simpler and more flexible' 
than before. If he does not obey the law he may not secure a 
deficiency judgment. 70 
Professor Gilmore also concludes that creditor compliance with the 
notice provisions of the Code was intended to operate as a condition 
precedent to the recovery of a deficiency, notwithstanding the absence 
of express statutory language to this effect, and endorses this position 
as both fair and reasonable in light of the minimal burden imposed 
upon the creditor by the default provisions of the Code: 
[T]hat a proper resale was a condition precedent to the recovery 
of a deficiency [in UCSA litigation] seemed too obvious to 
require either a reasoned analysis or the citation of precedent. 
What was obvious under UCSA may be equally obvious under 
Article 9. The relationship between the debtor's liability for a 
deficiency and the secured party's liability for non-compliance 
with the required default procedures seems to have escaped the 
conscious attention of the Article 9 Draftsmen as it escaped 
that of the UCSA draftsman. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
[barring recovery of a deficiency for non-compliance] is 
eminently reasonable. In light of the minimal formal require-
ments which Article 9 prescribes for disposition of collateral, 
the conclusion may be more reasonable under Article 9 than it 
was under the enormously complicated procedure required by 
UCSA. We may conclude that the secured party's compliance 
with the default provisions of Part 5-both the formal require-
ments of notice and the like and the substantial requirement of 
a "commercially reasonable" sale-is a condition precedent to 
the recovery of a deficiency.7l 
One of the earliest decisions barring recovery of a deficiency for 
non-compliance with the notice provisions of the Code, Skeels v. 
Universal C.l. T. Credit Corp.,n is noteworthy in several respects. First, 
it is a case in which a federal district judge sitting in Pennsylvania felt 
free to disregard two lower state court decisions 73 that were in 
apparent disagreement with its position. Secondly, it was one of the 
rare cases in which the repossessed collateral was neither a consumer-
debtor's motor vehicle nor some type of business equipment, but rather 
70.Id, 
71. GILMORE § 44.9.4, at 1263-64 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 
72. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.O. Pa. 1963), modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
73. Alliance Discount v. Shaw, 195 Pa. SUper 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961) and Atlas Credit 
Corp. v. Dolbow, 192 Pa.Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1960). 
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consisted of the debtor's entire business inventory of new and used 
cars. In this respect, the facts of Skeels bring it especially close to our 
hypothetical, in which the entire brick inventory of the Company was 
repossessed and sold. While there are doubtless special considerations 
that warrant greater protection against deficiencies for consumer 
debtors, the utter finality of a business inventory repossession and 
resale, and the fact that creditor action effectively puts the debtor out 
of business, would seem to militate in favor of a particular solicitude 
for the rights of the business debtor and the guarantors upon default. 
This fact does not appear to have escaped the conscious attention of 
the Skeels court, since its opinion emphasizes a determined effort to 
implement the real purpose and policy of the notice requirements of 
the Code. The Skeels case arose as a debtor's suit against its secured 
creditor for an unlawful conversion of its auto-dealer business. The 
defendant creditor then brought a counter-claim seeking a deficiency 
judgment for the losses and expenses incurred upon resale of the 
repossessed collateral. It was "conceded ... that no notice whatsoever 
was given to Skeels at the time the cars, new or used, were sold. There 
was simply no compliance by defendant with [Section 9-504(3)] of 
the ... Code.,,74 The court's holding barring recovery of the deficiency 
would thus seem to be of singular precedential significance to our 
hypothetical Guarantor. In a much quoted passage from the opinion, 
Judge Willson explained the basis of the court's holding: 
It seems to this [court], however, that to permit recovery by 
the security holder of a loss in disposing of collateral when no 
notice has been given, permits a continuation of the evil which 
the Commercial Code sought to correct. The owner should have 
an opportunity to bid at the sale. It was the secret disposition 
of collateral by chattel mortgage owners and others which was 
an evil which the Code sought to correct .... A security holder 
who disposes of collateral without notice denies to the debtor 
his right of redemption which is provided him in Section 9-506. 
In my view, it must be held that a security holder who sells 
without notice may not look to the debtor for any loss.75 
Other courts have displayed an understanding of commercial realities 
and a perception of the peculiar relevance of the notice requirements in 
the context of the business debtor's situation. 76 A business debtor may 
be, arguendo, better situated than the consumer debtor with respect to 
obtaining new financing after default so as to exercise its right of 
redemption. However, it is also, because of contacts in the business and 
a knowledge of customers, dealers and others likely to be interested in 
74. 222 F. Supp. at 702. 
75. [d. 
76. E.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 uec REP. 899 (D.C. Mich. 1971). 
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purchasing the collateral, in a better position than the consumer debtor 
(or, for that matter, the secured creditor) to drum up interest in the 
sale so as to drive up the level of bids on a bona fide basis.77 
Conscientious examination of precedents from analogous areas of the 
law has provided courts with insights into the requirements of a sound 
public policy on the deficiency problem. In G.l. T. Corp. v. Haynes, 78 
the court scrutinized the law of mortgages, as well as judicial treatment 
of deficiencies under pre-Code statutes governing conditional sales 
contracts, in order to accomplish this end. Although the facts of this 
case, involving a conditional sales contract, arose long before the 
effective date of the Maine UCC and the statute referred to was one 
governing conditional sales, the court pointed out in a footnote that 
Section 9-504 of the UCC similarly requires "reasonable notification" 
of resale. 79 After an historical survey similar to that made in Leasco, 
the Haynes court concluded that the creditor was barred, stating: 
[A]t common law the terms of the contract controlled and, 
absent appropriate provision for redemption upon default, the 
vendee was without remedy unless he performed as agreed .... 
[S]tatutes soon were enacted to protect the improvident and 
impecunious vendee from unfair dealing and imposition ... 
some of which have been embodied within the ... Uniform 
Commercial CQde. 
While neither our statute nor the contract under discussion 
requires a resale, the rule that the provisions of a statute 
prescribing manner of resale must be observed as a condition 
precedent to holding the [debtor] for a deficiency judgment, is 
by weight of authority enforced.80 
Still other courts have resorted to analogous areas of the law at some 
point in their treatment of the deficiency judgment issue. For example, 
77. As the Ferris court stated: 
The court holds that the defendants did not receive reasonable notification. Had 
the defendants had more time, when they knew foreclosure was inevitable, they 
could have perhaps contacted the retail outlets of the plaintiff and notified them 
of the sale in order that these individuals could be present to bid in whatever 
parcels of the collateral they might wish to purchase. Admittedly, the court is 
dealing in a presumption that the retail dealers of the plaintiff would have been 
interested in purchasing some of the items. However, in view of the short notice, 
the plaintiff must permit the court to indulge in this presumption. 
The court feels that the duty of the creditor in this instance was to obtain the best 
possible price it could obtain for the collateral for the benefit of the debtor 
[without using] "extraor.dinary means" to accomplish this result. ... [d. at 
902-03. 
78. 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (Me. 1965). 
79. [d. at 437, n. l. 
80. [d. at 438-39 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), accord, Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. 
Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973). 
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the Georgia Court of Appeals appears to have approached the issue of 
the creditor's entitlement to a deficiency in the absence of notice to the 
debtor very tentatively at first; "like a skater testing March ice, [it] 
showed great hesitance to base its decision on the VCC .... Having 
tested the ice ... , however, [it] was finally willing to rest its conclusion 
exclusively on the VCC . ... "81 In Moody v. Nides Finance CO.,82 the 
court held that the creditor's repossession and resale without notice 
amounted to an accord and satisfaction,83 and stated, without 
explanation, that it was "not necessary [to] deal with the Code 
provisions in deciding this case .... We are content to rest the matter 
on the accord and satisfaction.. . though it appears that we would 
likely have reached the same result by applying VCC provisions. ,,84 
A short time later, however, in Braswell v. American National 
Bank,85 the Georgia court was prepared to base its decision squarely on 
the notice provisions of the VCC, perhaps because "the repossession 
[there] ... seems to have been lawful so as to possibly preclude the 
application of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction .... ,,86 Finding 
that "neither the notice alleged nor the notice proved [by the secured 
party] complied with [Section 9-504(3) of the Code] ,,,87 the court 
held that the creditor was barred from recovery of a deficiency, stating: 
[T]he majority of the courts in this country in applying these 
provisions. . . have reached the conclusion that the act of the 
secured party, in selling the collateral without strict compliance 
with the notice of sale provisions, precludes the [debtor] from' 
exercising his right of redemption under Section ... 9-506, and 
for that reason the secured party cannot recover for the 
deficiency .... We concur with this view.88 
Some courts have resorted to sections of the VCC outside of Article 
Nine for additional guidance and support of their decisions. A good 
example is Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan. 89 In this case of first impression, 
the California Court of Appeals held that a "failure [to give notice was] 
a bar to a deficiency judgement where ... such failure was raised as an 
affirmative defense. ,,90 The court pointed out that VCC Sec-
81. White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales and Deficiency 
Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. D.L. REV. 808,831 (1970). 
82. 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967). 
83. Id. at 861, 156 S.E.2d at 311·12. See also Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga. 
App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968). 
84. Id. at 861, 156 S.E.2d at 312 (footnotes omitted). 
85. 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968). 
86. Id. at 700, 161 S.E.2d at 422. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 701, 161 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added). 
89. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972). 
90. Id. at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The court expressed the basis for its decision as 
follows: . 
We are persuaded that the better reasoning and the ends of justice require the 
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tion 1-102(1) provides that: "This code shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."91 More 
centrally, however, the court looked to Section 1-103 of the UCC in 
order to evaluate the defendant's argument that Section 9-507 must be 
a cumulative remedy since it is not expressly stated to be the exclusive 
remedy, and state law relating to the consequences of failure to give 
notice of the sale could thus provide guidance.92 Section 1-103 of the 
UCC provides as follows: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Code, the 
principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions. 
Examining California law prior to the enactment of the UCC, the court 
found what the Leasco court had found to be the almost universal 
result-that "a creditor who disposed of property after default without 
following the notice requirements of the mortgage agreement, ha[d] 
extinguished the mortgage lien and [was] thus barred from recovering a 
deficiency judgment."93 The court, therefore, agreed with the defend-
ant that the debtor's remedy under UCC Section 9-507 is not exclusive 
but cumulative, and held that lack of notice pursuant to 9-504(3) is 
available as an absolute defense in the suit for a deficiency.94 
The Supreme Court of Iowa very recently turned to still another 
section of the Code for guidance and support of its decision to bar a 
deficiency for lack of notice. In Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. 
Halling,95 the court relied on the analogy provided by the notice 
requirements of Section 2-706(3) in sustaining the trial court's direction 
of a verdict in favor of the defendant debtor. The Official Comments to 
Section 9-504 draw attention to the similarities between a secured 
party's resale of repossessed collateral after default and a seller's resale 
of goods pursuant to a default by the buyer. Section 2-706, dealing 
with the latter situation, requires in Subsection (3) that: "Where the 
resale is a private sale the seller must give the buyer reasonable 
notification of his intention to resell." Official Comment Eight to 
acceptance of defendant's contention and reversal of the judgment [of the trial 
court in favor of the secured party]. 
The most natural and reasonable construction of the statutory language, in 
the light of the legal background, the realities of the relationships involved 
between secured creditors and debtors who have defaulted and their respective 
financial resources for engaging in litigation, all lead to the conclusion that the 
right to a deficiency judgment depends on compliance with the statutory 
requirements concerning dispositions and notice. Id. at 1008·09, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 
321. 
See also Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973), and Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). 
91. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1004, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 318. 
92. Id. at 1005, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 318. 
93.Id. 
94. Id. at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321. 
95. 205 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1973). 
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Section 2-706 makes it clear that reasonable notification in this context 
exactly parallels the notice provisions of Section 9-504(3) with respect 
to private sales, that is, that "[n]otification of the [precise] time and 
place of this type of sale is not required;" what is required, is 
notification of intention to resell, or in the language of Sec-
tion 9-504(3), "notification of the time after which any private sale ... 
is to be made ... .',96 
The foregoing cases furnish a representative sample of the sources, 
reasoning and policy of the Majority approach to the issue presently 
under examination. Numerous other jurisdictions are in accord.97 The 
opinions vary as to the emphasis which is placed upon any given factor, 
but, clearly, all of these courts have concluded that barring the 
deficiency as a matter of law is supported by: 
(a) A reasonable statutory construction of the relevant provisions of 
the VCC; 
(b) Extensive judicial experience with interpretation of similar 
provisions of the VCSA; 
(c) Insights gained from legislative and judicial treatment of analo-
gous problems in the law of mortgages and judicial sales; and 
(d) The dictates of justice and of a sound social and economic 
policy. 
2. The Minority Rule Cases 
The Minority approach to the problem of the secured party's failure 
to give notice as required by Section 9-504(3) apparently originated 
with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Norton v. 
National Bank of Commerce. 98 The effect of lack of notice on the 
defendant's liability for a deficiency was discussed only in the last two 
paragraphs of the opinion, in which the court merely concluded that 
"[w]e do not agree with [Norton's] contention that the bank's failure 
to give him notice of the intended sale completely discharged his 
96. In the absence of the notice required by the above-cited sections of the Code, the Iowa 
court in Twin Bridges sustained the trial court by holding that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover a deficiency judgment. 
97. Accord, In re Bro Cliff Inc., 8 UCC REP. 1144 (W.O. Mich. 1971); Commercial Credit 
Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 UCC REP. 15 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1973); Edmondson v. Air Servo Co., 123 
Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971); Prairie Vista, Inc. V. Casella, 12 Ill. App. 3d 34, 
297 N.E.2d 385 (1973); Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 133 Ill. App. 2d 717, 271 N.E.2d 
404 (1971); Nelson V. Monarch Inv. Plan of Henderson, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 
1970); Camden Nat'l Bank V. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); One Twenty Credit 
Union V. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64 (1968); Foundation Discounts, Inc. V. Serna, 81 
N.M. 474,468 P.2d 875 (1970); Jefferson Credit Corp. V. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138,302 
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969); Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 
646 (1965); Aimonetto V. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972). Cf United States V. 
Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Neb. 1971). 
98. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). The primary question was whether Norton, who 
had assigned a conditional sales contract to the bank with a provision to repurchase if the 
conditional vendee defaulted, was a "debtor" under UCC Section 9-504(3), entitled to 
notice of the disposition of a repossessed automobile. The court held that he was. 
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obligation.,,99 The basis for the court's conclusion and the nature of its 
reasoning- are left largely to speculation. Some insight may be gleaned 
from the court's observation that "[f]or the most part [Sec-
tion 9-504(3) of] the Code follows the theory formerly applicable to 
mortgages, by which the debtor was entitled to any surplus realized 
upon foreclosure and was liable for any deficiency."loo Following this 
observation, the court recited the provisions of Section 9-507(1) that 
give the debtor a right to recover from the secured party any loss 
caused by a failure to comply with the default provisions of the Code. 
The relationship of these two provisions was, however, never explained. 
-In the final paragraph of the opinion, the court expressed its concern 
with preventing the non-compliant creditor from benefiting from its 
own misconduct: 
Upon the issue of Norton's damages simple considerations of 
fair play cast the burden of proof upon the bank. It was the 
bank which wrongfully disposed of the car without notice to 
the debtors. Thus it was the bank's action that made it at least 
difficult, if not impossible, for Norton to prove the extent of -
his loss with reasonable certainty .... It would be manifestly 
unfair for the creditor to derive an advantage from its own 
misconduct. 101 
Having thus set out what might reasonably serve as a sufficient 
justification for a total bar to recovery of a deficiency judgment, the 
court, without further elaboration held that a fictional presumption 
was the best way to handle the problem, stating: 
We think the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the 
first instance that the collateral was worth at least the amount 
of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of 
proving the amount that should reasonably have been obtained 
through a sale conducted according to law. The extent to which 
the penalty set out in [9-507(1)] may be applicable in the case 
at bar is an issue that may depend upon the further develop-
ment of the proof.102 -
The presumption which was to spawn the Minority line of cases thus 
sprang into being. Courts adhering to this view have adopted, more or 
less uncritically, this presumption as their solution to the problem of 
lack of notice. With one possible exception,103 the Minority rule was 
99. Id. at 149,398 S.W.2d at 54142. 
100. Id. at 149, 398 S.W.2d at 542. 
101. Id. at 149·50, 398 S.W.2d at 542. 
102. Id. at 150,398 S.W.2d at 542. 
103. Investors Acceptance Co. of Livingston, Inc. v. James Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 
454 S.W.2d 130 (1969) (resale of unspecified portion of debtor's accounts receivable). In 
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apparently fashioned exclusively in factual contexts which, like Norton, 
involved the repossession and resale of motor vehicles or business 
equipment and fixtures. In none of these cases did the repossessed 
collateral consist of the entire business inventory and accounts 
receivable of the debtor as it did in our hypothetical. 
Three frequently cited opinions, contributing to the inaccurate 
impression that a long and growing body of precedents supports the 
Minority position are Arkansas cases decided largely on the authority of 
Norton: Barker v. Horn,104 Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc. lOS and 
Universal C.l. T. Credit Co. v. Rone. 106 A fourth, Leasing Associates, 
Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 107 is a federal court decision applying 
Arkansas law as embodied in the decisions of Norton and Barker. None 
of these cases undertakes an independent evaluation of the Norton rule 
or betrays any hint of awareness of the competing Majority rule or 
discusses its comparative merits. The Norton rule is simply stated to be 
the established law of Arkansas on the subject; the provisions of the 
rule are reiterated, and then applied to the facts at hand. This lack of 
independent analysis substantially detracts from the precedential value 
of these decisions. 
Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co. /08 another frequently cited Minority 
case, is largely unpersuasive for the same reason. The issue of lack of 
notice, one of several issues arising out of the repossession and sale of 
certain trucks, was summarily disposed of by the court on the basis of a 
terse, three-line recitation of the Minority rule. The statement was 
supported only by a footnote reference to Norton. 109 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals took a Minority approach in 
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp.110 Although the court 
emphasized that the purpose of the notice requirements was "for the 
benefit and protection of the debtor" and that "[t]his provision of the 
Act should be construed and applied in a manner to effectuate this 
salutary purpose ... ,"lll its consideration of the possible remedies for 
another Minority case, Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 Misc. 2d 181, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973), there is no reference to the nature of the collateral involved. 
104. 245 Ark. 315,432 S.W.2d 21 (1968). 
105. 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970). 
106. 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970). 
107. 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971). 
108. 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969). 
109. The court said: 
Where non·compliance with the notice of sale provISIOns of [VCC Section 
9·504(3)] has been shown, the burden of proving that the market value of the 
collateral was received at sale is upon the secured party. Id. at 91·92. 
In re Thomas, 12 VCC REP. 578 (W.D. Va. 1973), is a more recent example of this 
same genre of uncritical authority. In that case, notice had in fact been sent, but the sale 
was conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner. The court, without giving its 
reasoning, and with no citation of precedent other than Barker v. Hom, merely reiterated 
the presumption rule approach, and applied it to the facts at hand. 
110. 57 Tenn. App. 106,415 S.W.2d 347 (1966). 
111. Id. at 113,415 S.W.2d at 350·51. 
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creditor non-compliance was singularly circumscribed. Without reason, 
explanation, or justification, the court simply leaped from a definition 
of the repossessed car as "consumer goods" to the conclusion that the 
minimum recovery provisions of Section 9-507 pre-empted the field. 
Any further analysis was apparently deemed foreclosed by that part of 
Section 9-507 that provides: 
If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to 
recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service 
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or 
the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price. 
Although the Norton presumption is not expressly mentioned, the 
court's order that an "off-set" from the judgment should be allowed 
the defendants for the amount due them 112 would seem to place 
Mallicoat in the ranks of the Minority. The court never even considered 
the possibility that recovery of the deficiency could be barred. The 
mere existence of the provision for a minimum recovery apparently 
impressed the court as reason enough to warrant an "off-set." The real 
import of the court's decision, whether intended or not, is that 
recovery of damages (in an amount not less than the minimum 
prescribed) is the debtor's sole remedy for the secured party's 
non-compliance with the default provisions of the Code. 
This conclusion does not hold up under close analysis. A provision 
for minimum recovery and a provision for exclusive recovery are two 
entirely different concepts. As previously noted, Section 1-103 of the 
VCC precludes implications of exclusivity unless expressly designated in 
the relevant sections of the VCC. Furthermore, a provision granting the 
right to seek affirmative recovery, whether a minimal recovery is 
mentioned or not, in no way precludes the right to assert all available 
and relevant defenses. There would thus seem to be no sanction either 
in the VCC or in logic for the conclusion that an off-set of damages is 
the only possible consequence of creditor misconduct. Inasmuch as the 
court did not entertain, let alone refute, the possibility of barring the 
secured party's deficiency as a potential remedy for non-compliance, 
Mallicoat, too, may be properly characterized as weak or unpersuasive 
authority.113 
T&W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc.,1l4 probably ranks as a 
co-equal with Norton in inspiring Minority rule decisions. Having 
112. 57 Tenn. App. at 115,415 S.W.2d at 351·52. 
113. See also Investor's Acceptance Co. of Livingston, Inc. v. James Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. 
App. 307, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1968), in which the court referred to the existence of 
authorities in other jurisdictions, but contented itself with merely quoting from 
Mallicoat and Norton. 
114. 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969). In an opinion which cut through formal 
distinctions to achieve the functional results advocated by the draftsmen of the UCC, the 
court held that the accommodation endorsers of the defendant corporation's note were 
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decided the plaintiff had not complied with Section 9-504(3) of the 
VCC, the court briefly turned to the question of the consequences. 
Again, the familiar Minority pattern emerged. Apparently, the mere 
existence of an affirmative right to recovery in Section 9-507 impressed 
the court as dispositive of the issue. Citing only Norton, Barker and 
Weaver, the court held: 
The presumption is that where a secured party repossesses and 
resells collateral, and notice of the resale is required and not 
given, the burden of proving the value of the collateral in a 
deficiency action is on the secured party. Failing this, the value 
is presumed to be at least the amount of the debt. The court 
will indulge in this presumption because it would be manifestly 
unjust to allow plaintiff to profit by its own wrongdoing. liS 
What is significant about the court's decision, however, is not so 
much what it said as what it actually did; it denied the secured party 
any further opportunity to present evidence to rebut the presumption 
peremptorily raised. Moreover, unlike the Mallicoat case, there was to 
be no re-hearing on the question of damages. After asserting that it 
debtors within the meaning of Section 9·504(3) of the Code entitled to notice of a 
private sale of the repossessed collateral. 
115. [d. at 337, 258 A.2d at 167 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Accord, Abbott 
Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964). Contra, One Twenty Credit 
Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64 (1968), which did not follow Abbott. It barred 
the deficiency on the grounds that "[ Section 9-504(3)] was passed with a view to 
protecting the interest of the borrower ... [and] the provisions of the statute must be 
followed." [d. at 65-66. 
Two early Pennsylvania superior court decisions, Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 
195 Pa. Super. 601,171 A.2d 548 (1961), and Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 192, Pa. 
Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1960), frequently cited in support of the Minority rule, were 
not followed by the federal district court in Pennsylvania in the later case of Skeels v. 
Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified on other 
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, the narrow holding in the Shaw 
case actually consisted of an order affirming the trial court's order making absolute a rule 
to open a judgment entered by confession against the defendants on grounds that lack of 
notice of the sale of the repossessed automobile was a "prima facie meritorious 
defense. .. [enabling the court] in the exercise of its discretion, [to] open the 
judgment." 195 Pa. Super. at 605, 171 A.2d at 550-51. At best, Minority thinking was 
implied in the result of the court's action which was to give the debtor a chance upon 
rehearing, "to have the reasonable value of the automobile determined upon resale as 
required by the [Pennsylvania] Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act .... " [d. at 604, 171 
A.2d at 550. There is nothing in the opinion to even suggest that the debtor raised, or 
that the court considered, the argument that non-compliance with the notice provisions 
should be an absolute defense to a suit for a deficiency. 
Similarly, the Dolbow case merely affirmed the action of the trial court in 
reopening a judgment secured by the creditor. It allowed the debtor to file a 
counterclaim for damages under the consumer goods recovery portion of Section 9-507, 
permitting the case to be tried before a jury and refusing to grant a new trial or judgment 
n.o.v. after the jury brought in a verdict for the debtor on the counterclaim. At best, the 
Minority rule approach with respect to off-sets may be hidden in the arithmetic of the 
jury's verdict thus affirmed by the court, but the opinion does not consider the argument 
that non-compliance should result in a bar to a claim for a deficiency. 
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would be unfair to allow a plaintiff to benefit from his wrong, the 
court unceremoniously found that the collateral was worth at least the 
amount of the debt and discharged the accommodation endorsers on 
both the note and security agreement. The practical result of the 
court's action was thus indistinguishable from the effect that would 
have followed a ruling that compliance with the notice provisions of the 
Code was a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency. While 
apparently lulled into such indirection by its reliance on the Norton, 
Barker and Weaver precedents, the court's handling of the matter of 
liability in this case was, in fact, entirely consistent with its avowed 
devotion to fair and functional results. 116 
In Conti-Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 117 the plaintiff car dealer 
assigned the retail installment security agreement covering the car to a 
bank. Upon default, the bank repossessed and resold after sending 
notice which the debtor never received. The bank then reassigned its 
right to a deficiency to the dealer who brought suit against the 
defaulting purchasers. They, in turn, asserted a counterclaim against the 
bank for damages pursuant to Section 9-507(1). Equating lack of 
receipt of notice with failure to send notice, the court proceeded to 
survey some of the authorities on both sides of the question of 
entitlement to a deficiency judgment in the absence of prior notice, and 
concluded that "the better rule is the one enumerated in the T&W and 
Norton cases .... "118 
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, however, the court came 
up with results that positively defy the "spirit of commercial 
reasonableness" which it was avowedly pursuing. The entire amount of 
Additionally, in Community Management Ass'n. of Colorado Springs, Inc. v. 
Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973), a case involving repossession and 
resale of an automobile, the court simply stated, after citing authority on both sides of 
the question, that it adopted the "reasoriing" of the Minority line of authority. No basis 
for this choice is expressed, so it is impossible to analyze the court's reasoning. See also, 
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 Misc. 2d 181, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); 
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lyon Air, Inc., 8 UCC REP. 1121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
Accord, United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974) (predicting 
that the Texas Courts would adopt the Minority rule that the existence of a remedy 
under Section 9·507 negates the inference that the draftsmen of the Code intended the 
harsher remedy of barring a deficiency judgment as well). 
116. Tauber v. Johnson, 8 III. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972), similarly sounds in the 
language of the Minority, yet acts with the purpose and results of the Majority. Indeed, 
in this case, there is room for reasonable doubt as to which rule the court actually 
thought it was applying. Despite much talk about presumptions, the court stated: "If the 
secured party cannot sustain his burden of proving a commercially reasonable resale, he 
may be denied the amount of the deficiency." [d. at 794, 291 N.E.2d at 184. Skeels v. 
Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.O. Pa. 1963), modified on other 
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1969), a leading Majority rule exponent, was cited as 
authority for the foregoing quote. Ultimately, however, the court achieved a Majority 
rule result equivalent to a holding that compliance with the statutory mandate of notice 
was a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency. Like the court in T&W, it 
precluded the creditor from offering further evidence to rebut the presumption, by 
reversing and remanding with directions simply to enter judgment in favor of defendants. 
117. 8 UCC REP. 1348 (D.C. N.J. 1971). 
118. [d. at 1351. 
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the deficiency sued for by the dealer, Conti, was $258.12. The court 
allowed a judgment in the amount of the deficiency subject to any 
defense that was available to the Jarossys against the bank.119 The 
court then proceeded to look to the affinnative remedies set out in 
Section 9-507(1). Seizing upon the minimum recovery provisions, the 
court detennined that the Jarossys were entitled to recover a total of 
$872.00 on their counterclaim, representing the time-price differential 
plus ten percent of the cash price. The court then set off the $258.12 
deficiency judgment against Jarrossy's $872 recovery, thereby eliminat-
ing the deficiency. 120 The Jarossys, who had suffered no provable harm 
beyond exposure to Conti's deficiency action, wound up with an award 
of damages amounting to more than twice the amount of the claimed 
deficiency. The bank, which had shown good faith at least to the extent 
of sending a prior notice, wound up having to pay what was, in effect, 
punitive damages. All this occurred in a case in which everybody 
concerned had stipulated that the resale price of the car was its fair and 
reasonable value. 
That a court may be goaded into the Minority camp by the egregious 
behavior of the debtor, is evident from the case of Grant County 
Tractor Co. v. NUSS. 121 This is particularly unfortunate since the case 
came up as one of first impression in the State of Washington. From the 
court's careful recitation of the facts as well as from some of its 
comments, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that estoppel was the 
real impetus behind the court's decision. 
In August of 1968, the defendants in Nuss purchased a tractor, a 
rotovator and a packer from the plaintiff under a written security 
agreement. Approximately one year later, the defendants decided to 
exchange the tractor for a different model. To consummate this 
exchange a new contract and security agreement were executed 
replacing the prior agreement. The first annual payment thereunder was 
due and payable by the defendants on September 1, 1969. The 
defendants defaulted, but kept and continued to use the equipment 
until January 9, 1970. On that day, they "unilaterally and without 
request delivered the tractor, rotovator and packer to plaintiff's sales 
yard,"122 and a week later, notified the plaintiff in writing that they 
had elected to rescind the contract. In April 1970, the plaintiff sold the 
tractor without first giving notice of the sale to the defendants, and 
then brought suit to recover a deficiency judgment. The defendants 
counterclaimed, seeking rescission of the contract and damages by 
reason of the alleged defective condition of the equipment. 
It should be noted that at the time the defendants returned the 
equipment and elected to rescind the contract, they had enjoyed the 
use of the allegedly defective rotovator and packer for approximately 
119. [d. at 1352. 
120. [d. 
121. 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). 
122. [d. at 867, 496 P.2d at 967. 
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one and a half years and the tractor for approximately six months. The 
trial court found as a fact that the defendant's use of the rotovator and 
packer had depreciated their value to $300 and $50, respectively, so 
that they were fit only for salvage. Of greatest importance is the fact 
that the alleged deficiency did not come about as a result of the sale of 
the tractor. Apparently, the plaintiff had been able to sell the tractor 
for the full contract price, since the deficiency sought to be recovered, 
$3,507, represented only the purchase price of the rotovator and 
packer less their salvage value.123 The court specifically pointed out 
that "[d]efendants [did] not contest this amount ... but argue[d] 
that the plaintiff [was] not entitled to a judgment for that amount 
because it failed to give notice of the sale of the tractor.,,124 
To bar the secured party's deficiency under these circumstances 
would have been tantamount to granting rescission of the contract for 
two pieces of equipment that the defendants had reduced to mere 
salvage. This the appellate court apparently could not bring itself to do. 
Stating tersely that it adopted the "reasoning" of the Minority line of 
cases, the court demonstrated how foremost in .its thoughts was the fact 
that the defendants had suffered no loss by the sale of the tractor. 
Citing the affirmative remedy available in Section 9-507(1), the court 
stated that: 
[I]n the instant case if the sale of the tractor without notice 
had resulted in a loss to the defendants, the defendants would 
have a right in the instant proceeding to claim that loss against 
the deficiency sought by the plaintiff.12s 
The court then proceeded to articulate what was probably the real 
rationale behind its holding and upon which it might have disposed 
more forthrightly of the issue: 
[I]t sho~.lld be noted that defendants unilaterally and volun-
tarily delivered to plaintiff complete control of the security and 
gave written notice of their election to rescind the transaction. 
It has been held that such conduct constitutes a waiver of the 
debtor's right to reasonable notice of an impending sale or 
estops the debtor from claiming a violation of the statute. 126 
It can be argued with some force that the Majority approach should not 
be rejected on the authority of a decision such as Nuss, tailored, as it 
obviously was, to the non-meritorious defense of a singularly unsym-
pathetic debtor. 
123. [d. at 871, 496 P.2d at 969-70. 
124. [d. at 869,496 P.2d at 968. 
125. [d. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969. 
126. [d. 
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One feature that readily distinguishes the Minority rule cases from 
our hypothetical is that, almost invariably, they involved disposition of 
repossessed motor vehicles or business equipment and fixtures, rather 
than collateral consisting of the debtor's inventory and accounts 
receivable. While there are, doubtless, special considerations that should 
govern deficiencies in the consumer-debtor area, not the least of which 
may be the widespread incidence of the problem, there also are, or 
ought to be, special considerations governing deficiencies in the kind of 
business default situation presented by our hypothetical. A consumer-
debtor who loses his car does not necessarily lose his means of 
livelihood. A business that loses some or even all of its fixtures and 
equipment, while in a patently more serious situation, may be able to 
recoup somewhat, borrow or buy new equipment, or possibly even 
secure new financing if it is allowed to retain its inventory and 
receivables. On the other hand, a manufacturing firm, with no 
inventory or receivables at all, is effectively out of business and the 
livelihood of all those who depended upon it is lost. All that is left to 
the debtor in this predicament is the protection afforded by the notice 
requirements: the opportunity of redeeming, or, more substantially, the 
opportunity of minimizing the amount of indebtedness by taking steps 
to drive up, on a bona fide basis, the level of bids at the sale. If the 
purposes and policy of the notice requirements are to have any tangible 
meaning for this debtor they will have to provide a defense to its 
creditor's action for a deficiency, rather than an affirmative action for 
damages. The creditor has the power not only to protect fully his own 
interests, but also to foreclose all challenge and complaint by the 
debtor by simply adhering to the flexible and liberalized procedures of 
the VCC. 
In view of the slight onus placed upon the creditor, as opposed to the 
irrevocable consequences to the business debtor if the creditor elects to 
follow a course that deprives the debtor of its only realistic protection 
in the post-default situation, the Majority position that the creditor's 
breach provides the debtor with an absolute defense to the creditor's 
suit for a deficiency would appear to be the better rule. Yet, all such 
reflections are absent from the consumer-debtor-oriented Minority 
opinions. This failure to consider important matters of policy together 
with the lack of reasoning and uncritical adherence to precedent typical 
of the Minority decisions undermines their persuasiveness and limits the 
degree to which they could be relied upon by our hypothetical Lender. 
C. The Law in Maryland 
The precise issues under consideration herein appear never to have 
arisen in Maryland. Nevertheless, the approaches taken by the Maryland 
courts on closely analogous questions as well as their citation of 
Majority rule cases indicate that, given the opportunity to decide the 
matter, Maryland would probably align itself with the Majority; deem 
186 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5 
the Guarantor in our hypothetical a debtor within the meaning of 
Section 9-504(3), who is entitled to the notice provided for in that 
Section, and hold that the Secured Party's failure to give notice would 
bar a deficiency decree as a matter of law. 
A recent Court of Appeals opinion by Judge McWilliams, Crest 
Investment Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas,127 is instructive. Although the precise 
question for determination in Alatzas was whether oral notification 
satisfied the reasonable notification mandate of VCC Section 9-504(3) 
or whether only written notice would suffice,128 the court's approach 
to the issue displays all of the hallmarks of the best of the Majority rule 
decisions on deficiency judgments. The court looked first to the 
purpose of the notice requirements, and then examiried the relevant 
statutory language of Section 9-504(3) in light of the Official Com-
ment. 129 Finding that "reasonable notification" was not defined in 
Article Nine, the court looked to other sections of the Code for 
guidance. 13o It held, on the basis of a functional analysis of the results, 
that the giving of actual notice was what counted, not whether the 
notice was given in written or verbal form.l3l Not content to rest 
matters there, the court carefully considered the authority available to 
it from textwriters and other jurisdictions. It pointedly disregarded the 
one case it found that required formal written notice as having been 
incorrectly decided on the basis of a misinterpretation of Barker v. 
Horn. 132 
The Maryland Court of Appeals case of Harris v. Bower,133 is also 
significant because the court's heavy reliance on a leading Majority rule 
127. 264 Md. 571,287 A.2d 261 (1972). 
128. The senior secured party allegedly repossessed and resold the collateral without adequate 
notice to the junior secured party. 
129. The Comment provides: 
Reasonable notification is not defined in this subtitle; at a minimum it must be 
sent in such time that persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to 
take appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or other 
disposition if they so desire. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-504, Comment 
5 (1975). 
130. 264 Md. at 575-76, 287 A.2d at 263, citing MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-504, 
Comment 5 (1975), quoting from §§ 1-201 (38) and 1-201 (25), in which the terms 
"send" and "notice," respectively, are defined. 
131. 264 Md. at 576,287 A.2d at 264. 
132. 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968). 
133. 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972). In Harris, the plaintiff filed a bill of complaint for 
an accounting, damages and other equitable relief in March, 1973, based upon the 
defendant's conduct following repossession of a boat purchased by plaintiff and her 
deceased husband from the defendant in 1966. The purchase price of the boat, $17,000, 
was evidenced entirely by the promissory note of the plaintiff and her husband and was 
payable over a period of two years from its date. The note was secured by a security 
interest in the boat granted by the plaintiff and her husband to the defendant. Following 
default under the note, the defendant obtained a summary judgment in the amount of 
approximately $22,000 against the plaintiff and her husband's estate (the husband died 
and his estate was insolvent) in December, 1969. The defendant repossessed the boat in 
March, 1970, when it had an uncontroverted fair market value of $13,900, and had still 
not resold it by the time the Harris case was tried in September, 1971. The lower court 
found that the value of the boat did not then equal the amount of the judgment 
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case, Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 134 in deciding 
closely analogous issues of law may indicate its thinking on the issues 
posed by our hypothetical. In determining whether a secured party's 
post-repossession acts and omissions in respect of the collateral were 
commercially reasonable, and the proper consequences that should be 
visited on commercially unreasonable conduct, the court relied solely 
on Dynalectron, quoting the following statement from that case: 
As the Court finds that the sale of the aircraft by the Plaintiff 
was not accomplished in a commercially reasonable manner, the 
Plaintiff is not entitled to a deficiency judgment against either 
Defendant. 4 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code § 9-502 :28 
states, "The creditor is not entitled to a deficiency judgment 
unless the sale of the collateral was conducted in a manner 
which was commercially reasonable.,,135 
While both the facts and the procedural posture of Harris were 
readily distinguishable from Dynalectron so that the above-quoted 
language may not even measure up to the status of dictum, the 
Dynalectron holding regarding the effect of the secured party's 
conduct-no compliance with Section 9-504(3), no deficiency judg-
ment-must have been looked upon with favor by the court and may 
well be prophetic of its approach to a secured creditor who fails to give 
notice under Section 9_504(3).136 
previously obtained by the defendant against the plaintiff, and, therefore, it was "not 
reasonable to expect the defendant to retain the boat in complete satisfaction of the 
[plaintiff's] obligation." [d. at 586, 295 A.2d at 873. See MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. 
Art., § 9·505(2) (1975). Denying the relief requested by the plaintiff, the trial court 
ordered that the boat be sold by judicial sale, and that the proceeds be applied in 
accordance with Section 9·504(1). If the proceeds were less than the amount of the 
judgment previously obtained by the defendant, the provisions of vec Section 9·504(3) 
as to deficiency would control. 266 Md. at 586, 295 A.2d at 873. 
On appeal, the plaintiff made two contentions. First, she argued that under 
Section 9·505(2), the defendant had accepted and retained possession of the boat in full 
satisfaction of her obligation to him. Secondly, it was contended that the defendant, in 
not reselling the boat during the period of time that had elapsed since repossession, had 
acted in a commercially unreasonable manner and that the loss resulting therefrom, 
namely, any decrease in value of the boat from the date of its repossession, should be set 
off against the defendant's judgment against the plaintiff. 
The court rejected the plaintiff's former contention, but agreed with the latter, 
stating that any "shrinking in value [of the boat from its uncontroverted $13,900 fair 
market value on its date of repossession] must be attributed to [the defendant's] 
conduct which we are persuaded to categorize as not commercially reasonable." [d. at 
592, 295 A.2d at 876. The case was then remanded with instructions to the lower court 
to determine the amount that the plaintiff should receive as a "credit" against the 
summary judgment entered against her: "We think the chancellor could very well find 
that the [plaintiff] is entitled to a credit of $13,900." [d. 
134. 337 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972). 
135. 266 Md. at 591, 295 A.2d at 875·76, (emphasis added), quoting from 337 F. Supp. at 
663. 
136. Similar inclinations towards the Majority rule view are evidenced by the decisions of 
lower courts in Maryland, such as the decision of the late Judge Gilbert Prendergast in 
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Maryland's approach to notice requirements in connection with real 
estate foreclosure sales may also provide a useful analogy. In Fleisher 
Co. v. Grice,137 the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the findings of 
the trial judge and refused to confirm the real estate foreclosure sale, 
solely on the basis that the pUblication of the advertisement of sale was 
not in strict accordance with the notice provisions of Maryland Rule 
W74(a)(2)(1).138 Citing a considerable number of precedents in Mary-
the niSI·priUS case of Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lilly, File No. 15480 (Ct. C.P. for 
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, 1970). The Lilly case arose as a suit for a deficiency 
under the MARYLAND RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT (the "Act"). MD. ANN. CODE art.83, 
§§ 128 et. seq. (1957), as recodified, MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., §§ 12-601 et. 
seq. (1975), but Judge Prendergast's comments on Section 9-504 of the UCC and his 
citations of authority in the course of his opinion leave little doubt that he would have 
reached the same conclusion had he been called upon to decide the case under the UCC. 
Section 141(c) of the Act requires that the creditor send written notice to the debtor 
after repossession, advising him, inter alia, of his right to redeem and his "rights as to a 
resale and his liability for a deficiency .... " 
Section 142(a) of the Act provides that: 
The holder shall retain repossessed goods for fifteen days after notice has been 
delivered pursuant to Section 141(c) .... 
The conditional vendor in Lilly had sent the written notice required by Section 
141(c) of the Act, but had resold the repossessed automobile on the fourteenth day 
thereafter, or one day too early. The trial court was of the opinion that: 
[A 1 secured creditor. who fails to conduct a re-sale properly and timely after 
repossession, has lost his claim for deficiency because he has foreclosed any right 
of redemption on the buyer's part and has not complied with the statutes. 
Accordingly, Judge Prendergast overruled the plaintiff's motion for a new trial or 
judgment n.o.v. Commenting on the fifteen-day retention of repossessed collateral 
required by the Act, the court said: 
This is confirmed in principle, though not specifically, by the provisions of Article 
95B, Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, setting forth the procedure 
to be followed by the secured parties exercising their right to dispose of collateral 
after default. ... While plaintiff may rationalize that Mr. Lilly did not show any 
disposition to redeem the automobile after repossession ... it would seem to be 
immaterial under the strict requirements of the statutes. 
The court then cited a number of precedents construing similar acts in other 
jurisdictions, including Associates Discount Corp. v. Carey, 47 N.Y. Misc. 2d 369, 262 
N.Y.S.2d 646 (1965), all of which held that non-compliance barred the recovery of a 
deficiency as a matter of law. 
Of significance, however, was the express analogy drawn by the court between the 
notice requirements of the Act and those of the Code. The court stated: 
In cases where no notice at all was given, the effect was held to be the same as 
that where invalid notice was afforded the debtor. In other words, if there is a 
non-compliance with the Code, there ceases to be any right to a deficiency 
judgment. 
As if to drive home this point, the court cited not only the opinion of Judge Willson in 
the Skeels case, but Professor Gilmore's conclusion that "the secured party's compliance 
with the default provisions ... both the formal requirements of notice and substantial 
requirement of 'commercially reasonable' sale-is a condition precedent to the recovery 
of a deficiency." GILMORE § 44.9.4, at 1264 (1965) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
137. 245 Md. 248, 226 A.2d 153 (1967). 
138. That rule provides: 
(i) For the sale of real estate or chattels real-at least once in each week for 
three successive weeks, the first such publication to be not less than fifteen days 
prior to sale and the last such publication to be not more than one week prior to 
sale. MD. RULES OF PROCEDURE R.W.74(a)(2). 
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land law holding that statutory notice provisions are mandatory, not 
directory, and, therefore, must be strictly observed, the court explained 
its unyielding response to even slight technical non-compliance in terms 
of the purpose for which the rule had been formulated. In language 
reminiscent of that used by Judge Willson in the Skeels case with 
respect to the enactment of the notice provisions of Article Nine of the 
UCC, the court observed with respect to Rule W74: 
That the interdiction of this kind of shenanigan was the reason 
for the rule scarcely needs saying. 139 
While there are undoubtedly relevant distinctions to be made 
between a real estate foreclosure sale and a resale of repossessed 
collateral under the UCC, the situations are so analogous, particularly 
with respect to the purpose designed to be served by the prior notice 
requirements, that the implications of the court's decision for the 
question being discussed cannot be safely overlooked. It is difficult to 
conceive how the same court that so firmly turned away the 
partially-compliant creditor in Fleisher could be induced to greet with 
greater sympathy the totally non-compliant creditor under Article 
Nine, whose burdens with respect to notice are manifestly less onerous. 
It may be that the unspoken premise in all this judicial concern with 
notice provisions is that which was articulated by the court in Litteral 
v. Houser,140 a case dealing with questions of pre-UCC pledge law: 
The Maryland cases make it plain that a pledgee is a fiduciary as 
to the pledgor and owes him a duty of fairness. They have laid 
down the rule that in case of default the pledgee must notify 
the pledgor and give a right to redeem .... 141 
The foregoing Maryland cases appear to be stamped with the 
Majority rule approach. The opinions have conscientiously analyzed the 
statutory construction of relevant Code provisions, and have ref~sed to 
be deflected from functional reasoning by purely technical distinctions. 
Unlike the characteristic Minority opinions, the Maryland courts have 
displayed the same readiness to disavow weak or unpersuasive authority 
as did the Leasco court. Given the Maryland Court of Appeal's reliance 
upon Dynalectron in deciding Harris, and its approach to notice 
provisions in analogous areas of the law, it would appear that Maryland 
Although the advertisement in Fleisher had been published a total of six times prior to 
the sale, there was a one week gap between publications so that the "three successive 
weeks" requirement of subsection (a)(2)(1) had not been satisfied. The court stated: 
Our inquiry is limited to the requirements of the rule and it is now firmly settled 
that there must be strict compliance. 245 Md. at 251, 226 A.2d at 155. 
139. 245 Md. at 251, 226 A.2d at 155. 
140. 221 Md. 403, 158 A.2d 75 (1960). 
141. Id. at 412, 158 A.2d at 79 (emphasis added). 
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would hold that strict compliance with the notice provisions of 
Section 9-504(3) is a condition precedent to the recovery of a 
deficiency judgment by the Secured Party in our hypothetical. 
II. Retention of Collateral in Satisfaction of the Obligation Under UCC 
Section 9-505(2) 
In our hypothetical transaction, the Lender had three possible 
courses of action with respect to the repossessed brick inventory and 
accounts receivable of the Company: (1) it could have sold or otherwise 
disposed of all the bricks and accounts and sued for any resultant 
deficiency; (2) it could have retained all the bricks and accounts in 
satisfaction of the obligation, foregoing any suit for a deficiency or 
(3) it could have sold or otherwise disposed of any part of the collateral 
and retained the rest in satisfaction of the obligation. Our Lender, 
however, attempted all three-sold part of the collateral (the bricks)" 
retained part (the accounts) and sued for a deficiency.142 Professor 
Gilmore has stated that retention of collateral "must ... discharge the 
entire obligation ... .'''43 Should our Lender's retention of the ac-
counts for one and one-half years amount to an "election," as a matter 
of law, to retain the accounts receivable in full satisfaction of the 
Company's obligation so as to discharge the Guarantor from all 
liability? 
While the result of a holding effectively discharging the initial 
indebtedness of $500,000 for total collateral proceeds of $100,000 
($50,000 from the sale of the brick inventory and $50,000 in 
collections on the accounts receivable) would, admittedly,. be hard on 
the Secured Party, it is a result that manifestly was within the power of 
a secured party to prevent, since the decision to indulge in inaction was 
its alone. It is, moreover, a result that can be supported by the VCC and 
one that has been upheld in analogous situations in the scant relevant 
cases that exist. 
VCC Section 9-505(2) provides that: 
In any other case involving consumer goods or any other 
collateral a secured party in possession may, after default, 
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. 
Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor and 
except in the case of consumer goods to any other secured 
party who has a security interest in the collateral and who has 
duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the 
debtor in this State or is known by the secured party in 
possession to have a security interest in it. If the debtor or other 
142. See pp. 154·55 supra. It should be noted that the VCC Section governing collection 
rights of a secured party on default, contains no prescribed time limit within which the 
secured party must undertake to collect from the account debtors. See MD. ANN. CODE, 
Comm. L. Art., § 9-502 (1975). 
143. 2 GILMORE, § 44.3 at 1223, n.2 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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person entitled to receive notification objects in writing within 
thirty days from the receipt of the notification or if any other 
secured party objects in writing within thirty days after the 
secured party obtains possession the secured party must dispose 
of the collateral under § 9-504. In the absence of such written 
objection the secured party may retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. 144 
The Official Comment to this Section explains that: 
Experience has shown that the parties are frequently better off 
without a resale of the collateral, hence this section sanctions an 
alternative arrangement. In lieu of resale or other disposition, 
the secured party may propose under subsection (2) that he 
keep the collateral as his own, thus discharging the obligation 
and abandoning any claim for a deficiency. 145 
191 
This "alternative arrangement," frequently referred to as "strict 
foreclosure" is, like the other provisions of Title Nine governing secured 
transactions, animated by an impulse to foster commercial reasonable-
ness. The Section does not commit the secured party to 'an all-or-
nothing course; it is entirely free to dispose of a part of the repossessed 
collateral if it deems that wise, while electing to retain the remaining 
collateral in satisfaction of the outstanding balance of the obligation. 
From a practical business point of view, it might make better sense, for 
example, for a lending institution like the Secured Party in our 
hypothetical to get out of the brick business in which it lacks expertise 
by promptly selling off the brick inventory. On the other hand, an 
election to retain the receivables for future collection or sale might be 
more practical since these activities are much closer to the sphere of 
competence and experience of the Secured Party. Section 9-505(2) 
preserves this option for the secured party. As Professor Gilmore 
explains: 
The statutory text refers to "the collateral" and "the obliga-
tion". This may be taken to mean "all or part of the collateral". 
With respect to the obligation, however, the proposal must be 
to discharge the entire obligation. Otherwise, the provision 
would open up a short cut, which would soon become a broad 
highway, to informal deficiency judgments. 146 
Preliminarily, it may also be observed that the right given to the 
debtor and other designated creditors to object to the proposal to 
144. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-505(2) (1975) (emphasis added). 
145. Id. Comment 1 (emphasis added). 
146. 2 GILMORE, § 44.3 at 1223, n.2 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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retain the collateral and to force its disposition under Section 9-504 was 
an attempt by the draftsmen to balance the equities. This option 
defuses the possibility that a secured creditor might "elect" to retain a 
million dollar chattel in satisfaction of a hundred dollar debt. As 
Professor Gilmore has stated: 
It is by no means true that all lenders have the economic power 
to dictate terms to their borrowers or that, if they have the 
power, they will misuse it to impose unfair terms. And yet it is 
obvious that over a broad range of situations the lender is in 
control and will naturally be tempted to exercise his power in 
his own self-interest which, however enlightened, is not neces-
sarily the same thing as the interest of the debtor or of 
competing creditors. 147 
The initiative to proceed with retention under Section 9-502(2) 
clearly belongs to the secured party: its written proposal compels a 
decision by the debtor and other creditors. It will be noted instantly 
that, in a departure from the standard practice in Title Nine of avoiding 
the VCSA's imposition of inflexible dates and deadlines, the VCC 
provided that the debtor, if it wishes to object to the secured party's 
proposal, must do so "in writing within thirty days from the receipt of 
the notification."148 No corresponding deadline is expressly put on the 
secured party; the Code does not specify a definite date by which the 
secured party must notify the debtor of its proposed election. Are 
there, therefore, no outer time limits on the secured party's choice? 
Could the Code have intended to place in the secured party the power 
to keep the debtor and other creditors dangling indefinitely in a state of 
suspension by the sheer expedient of withholding its proposal? Though 
relatively few courts have been confronted with the issue, most have 
said no. In the spirit of commercial reasonableness, there must come a 
time when the secured party's option to elect retention has run out. His 
failure to act will, at some time, cross the boundary between omission 
and commission and amount to a positive election as a matter of law. 
In Cox Motor Car Co. u. Castle,I49 no specific dates are given with 
respect to the period of time that elapsed between repossession and the 
filing of suit in either the trial court or the appellate court, but some of 
the basic principles in this area were clearly enunciated in the court's 
opinion. The decision was tantamount to a holding that the creditor 
had retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The purchaser of 
a Chevrolet truck under a conditional sale contract brought suit against 
his vendor for breach of warranty and was granted an award of 
damages. The vendor counterclaimed for the unpaid balance of the 
147. [d. at 1221. 
148. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 9-505(2) (1975). 
149. 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966). 
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purchase price of the truck, but was denied recovery. In affirming the 
lower court's decision, the appellate court stated: 
But still another obstacle stands in the way [of successful 
appeal]. According to the evidence the truck was repos-
sessed .... However, we find nothing in the record to show that 
there was a sale and an insufficiency of the proceeds thereof to 
cover the balance due on the conditional sale contract. 
Certainly Cox could not keep the truck and still make a claim 
for the amount of the unpaid balance on the contract. Having 
repossessed the ~Fuck, Cox was required to liquidate it at 
[a] reasonable ... sale, as a condition of seeking further 
recovery from Ca!!tle and Castle's obligation became limited to 
whatever deficiency remained after such a sale. 
In the absence of evidence that there was a sale and a 
defi~iency we think Cox did not make out a valid claim. ISO 
Whatever .our hypothetical Lender's subjective intention may have 
been at any point during the one and one-half years, an intention to 
retain the receivables in satisfaction of the obligation could, arguably, 
be imputed to it on the basis of its objective behavior. This is scarcely a 
novel idea in the law. Whether couched in terms of imputed intent, 
waiver or estoppel, as the context may require, legal consequences are 
attached to what parties have actually done regardless of what the 
parties may have hoped, intended or thought they were doing. 
Thus, for example, in that short period of time before it was ready to 
embrace the VCC openly, the Georgia Appellate Court carefully 
scrutinized the objective behavior of a repossessing creditor in order to 
determine whether the circumstances surrounding his repossession 
amounted-in law-to an "accord and satisfaction," or, in the language 
of the Code, an election to "retain the collateral in satisfaction of the 
obligation." In Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 151 in which the 
creditor took the car, telling the debtor, "You can't afford to tum it in, 
it's worth more than you owe on it,"IS2 the court found an accord and 
satisfaction. On the facts of Barnes v. Reliable Tractor Co., IS3 however, 
where the objective facts supported an attempt by the debtor to 
unilaterally impose an accord on an un consenting creditor at the time 
of repossession, the court refused to do so. 
In Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Co., Inc., IS4 the issue arose in the 
context of a suit by the vendor of an automobile against the guarantor 
of the conditional sales contract for recovery of the outstanding 
balance due on the contract. The defendant guarantor inartfully 
150. Id. at 432. 
151. 117 Ga. App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968). 
152. Id. at 131, 159 S.E.2d at 291. 
153. 117 Ga. App. 777, 161 S.E.2d 918 (1968). 
154. 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968). 
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"defended on the grounds that the repossession and retention of the 
automobile was a 'waiver' of the right to collect on the conditional sale 
contract."ISS The Georgia Appellate Court, in a transitional stage 
between its desire to rely on familiar common law doctrine and its later 
willingness to rest squarely on the provisions of the Code, held that: 
Irrespective of whether the law prior to the Georgia Uniform 
Commercial Code. .. or the Commercial Code itself applies 
here, the result is the same. See... § 9-501 et seq. of the 
Georgia Uniform Commercial Code. The action of the holder in 
legally repossessing the security under a conditional sale 
contract, the retention of the same without sale and without 
excuse for not selling ... for a period of approximately 50 days 
before suit on the contract and for over 16 months from the 
time of filing suit to the time of trial, constituted a rescission 
and satisfaction of the contract and no recovery could be had 
thereon. ls6 
A secured creditor's threshold argument would logically be that the 
entire subject of an election under Section 9-505(2) may not be 
considered unless and until he has first served a written proposal of 
retention, that is, that the proposal is a pre-requisite to any defense 
based on Section 9-505(2). This argument, however, was flatly rejected 
by the court in Northern Financial Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, 
Inc. ls7 It should be noted that the court in that case was not being 
asked to decide that, as a matter of law, the creditor had made an 
election: On the contrary, the defendant debtor's only purpose was to 
raise the election as a triable issue of fact in order to overcome the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In denying the plaintiff's 
motion, the court stated: 
In this connection, the plaintiff's failure to serve a proposal to 
retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt pursuant to 
§ 9-505(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code is not a bar to the 
defendants' claiming that plaintiff actually adopted such course 
of conduct with respect to that property. This type of notice 
serves only to relieve a secured creditor from being required to 
dispose of the property in accordance with § 9-504 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. ISS 
155. [d. at 782, 161 S.E.2d at 905·06. 
156. [d. at 782, 161 S.E.2d at 906 (emphasis added). 
157. 4 DCC REP. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). 
158. [d. at 675 (emphasis added). There is nothing to conflict with this in the holding of 
Priggen Steel Buildings Co. v. Parsons, 350 Mass. 62, 213 N.E.2d 252 (1966), which is 
sometimes cited for the proposition that strict foreclosure is ruled out in the absence of a 
proposal pursuant to Section 9·505(2}. While there was no proposal in Priggen, neither 
was there a retention of collateral; the repossessed portable metal building there involved 
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Similarly, in Brownstein v. Fiberonics Industries, Inc. /59 the court 
held that despite the failure of one of the creditors to serve a proposal 
of retention, the receiver of the insolvent debtor corporation had the 
option, much to his advantage, of treating the creditor's repossession 
and retention of certain machinery during the four-month period 
preceding the insolvency action as an election to retain the collateral in 
full satisfaction of the obligation. 
Thus, it can fairly be said that (1) the creditor's failure to serve a 
proposal of retention is not fatal to the debtor's claiming that the 
creditor actually adopted this course of conduct with respect to the 
property and (2) that in a proper case, this course of conduct may be 
found to have been adopted as a matter of law. 160 
There is also strong dictum to this effect in Harris v. 
Bower,161 where the court cited Bradford, Fiberonics and Chatwood as 
authority for the position that: 
[A] written proposal may not be absolutely essential, especially 
where the secured party conducts himself in a manner so unfair 
had been sold, and the resultant deficiency formed the basis of the plaintiff's suit. There 
is, thus, no real similarity between the facts of that case and our hypothetical facts. 
159. 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 (1970). 
160. See Michigan Nat'1. Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970). The 
background of this case is significant. The issue of retention was raised as a defense under 
Section 9-505(1), which required the creditor under a purchase money security interest 
in consumer goods to dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504, within ninety days 
after he takes possession "if the debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash price .... " The 
creditor had made strong and commercially reasonable efforts to resell the car, which 
was not only in a badly-damaged condition but also subject to a garageman's lien for 
storage charges. Having received no viable offers, it sued instead on the underlying 
promissory note. The debtor argued that the creditor was required to dispose of the 
collateral under Section 9-504 before bringing suit on the note, the analogy by 
implication being that the failure to do so amounts to an election to retain the collateral 
in satisfaction of the obligation. The issue of whether a proposal of retention is 
prerequisite to a finding of retention-in-fact thus never arose, since there is no 
requirement for such a proposal to be made under the terms of Section 9-505(1). The 
court dismissed the debtor's defense under Section 9-505(1) as totally inapplicable for 
the reason, inter alia, that the debtor had not paid 60 percent of the purchase price. In 
affirming the judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff, the court went on to say: 
This' does not mean, however, that the bank owes no duties to defendant with 
respect to the collateral. ... It would be unfair to allow a creditor to deprive the 
debtor of the possession and use of the collateral for an unreasonable length of 
time and not apply the asset or the proceeds from its sale toward liquidation of 
the debt. Moreover, it would be equally unfair to allow a creditor to take 
possession at all, if the creditor never intended to dispose of the security. For 
during the period that the debtor is deprived of possession he may have been able 
to make profitable use of the asset or may have gone to far greater lengths than 
the creditor to sell. Once a creditor has possession he must act in a commercially 
reasonable manner toward sale, lease, proposed retention where permissible, or 
other disposition. Id. at 108, 185 N.W.2d at 51 (emphasis added). 
The court found that the plaintiff had acted in a "commercially reasonable manner;" and 
that the defendant had suffered "[ no] loss by the plaintiff's failure to sell or return 
title." Id. at 109, 185 N.W.2d at 52. 
161. 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972). 
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or unreasonable as to amount to a retention of the collateral in 
satisfaction of the obligation. 162 
Speaking for the court, Judge McWilliams indicated that in a prgper 
case the court might find an election as a matter of law. He stated that 
the creditor in Harris had "come perilously close to painting himself 
into a corner in this regard."163 In the circumstances of Harris, 
however, the court was "unwilling ... to hold that what [the creditor 
had done] extinguishe[d] the entire debt."~64 
The circumstances in Harris differ from those in our hypothetical in 
several ways. First, the collateral consisted of a pleasure boat rather 
than the accounts receivable of a business. Secondly, there was 
uncontroverted testimony to show that the debtor's attorney had 
specific~lly proposed to the creditor that he "accept the return of the 
boat in exchange for the cancellation of the note" and that the 
creditor's reaction was a resounding rejection, in that, approximately 
one month later, he sued on the note and reduced it to a judg-
ment. 165 Thirdly, the creditor's behavior toward the collateral after 
gaining his judgment, while not commercially reasonable, nevertheless 
further served to support his contention that he had not factually made 
an election of retention, inasmuch as he had actually advertised the 
boat for sale and sent copies of the bids to the debtor's widow. On 
these facts it is not difficult to understand why Judge McWilliams felt 
that although the creditor had come "p~rilously close" to an election at 
law, he had not quite crossed the line. Fourthly, the issue of retention 
as a matter of law, did not reach the court until after there had been a 
full hearing on the merits. Therefore, the court had available to it all 
the facts in the case upon which to base a finding of commercial 
unreasonableness in the event that it could not find a retention as a 
matter of law. . . 
Finally, Harris arose as a suit by the debtor for an accounting and 
other equitable relief, and not as a creditor's suit for a deficiency. This 
makes it necessary to transpose and analogize what occurred with 
respect to recovery in the context of an affirmative action to the 
defensive posture of a guarantor. The debtor's claim that the creditor 
factually elected to retain the boat in satisfaction of the obligation 
must be seen for purposes of the analogy, as an absolute defense which, 
upon the facts in Harris, failed to hold up. Consequently, the 
"deficiency" was not barred as a matter of law. The debtor was then in 
the position of any other debtor seeking, by counterclaim or separate 
action, an affirmative recovery for damages under Section 9-507(1). In 
that situation, he is entitled only to provable damages which, in Harris, 
162. Id. at 587, 295 A.2d at 874 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 588, 295 A.2d at 874. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 581, 295 A.2d at 871. 
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amounted to the usual measure of damages for conversion: the amount 
of the debt less the fair market value of the boat at the time of 
repossession. 
There is nothing in this measure of damages to suggest that the 
Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted the "off-set" theory of the 
Minority courts in the lack of notice cases discussed earlier. On the 
contrary, had the "absolute defense" held up, had the facts in Harris 
been such as to warrant a finding of retention at law (thereby 
extinguishing the "deficiency") and had the value of the boat exceeded 
the amount of the debt, the Maryland court might demonstrably have 
shown that it was thinking along affirmative recovery rather than 
defensive lines, by granting an award of damages for the amount of the 
excess. In short, on the basis of Harris it may be said that, in a proper 
case, the Maryland Court of Appeals might be disposed to find an 
election to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation as a 
matter of law despite the creditor's failure to serve a written proposal 
thereof on the debtor. 
Stronger authority, however, is furnished by the recent decision in 
Farmers State Bank v. Otten. 166 There, Otten and Weiss borrowed 
$2,200 from the plaintiff bank and both signed the note. Otten also 
executed a security agreement to the bank on a tractor and trailer. As 
the court recited the facts, 
On April 4, 1969 Otten was in default in payment of the loan, 
whereupon the bank, under its security agreement, and Weiss 
(without any right) took physical possession of the collateral 
and thereafter retained possession of it. No proceedings were 
ever taken for sale or other disposition of the collateral under 
our Unifonn Commercial Code .... 167 
Some three months later the bank commenced action on the note 
against Otten, who made Weiss a party defendant. Weiss, as co-signer of 
the note, thereupon paid off the bank and made a claim against Otten 
for this amount. Otten cross-claimed against Weiss and the bank for 
damages resulting from the failure to make any disposition of the 
collateral. At the time of the trial, eleven months after repossession, the 
bank and Weiss were still in possession of the collateral. More than 
thirteen months after the date of repossession, the trial court entered a 
general judgment for Weiss against Otten based on the note "without 
any mention of a lien on any property of the security agreement," and 
dismissed Otten's cross-claim for damages. 168 Some fourteen and 
one-half months after repossession the collateral was sold to satisfy the 
166. 87 S.D. 161,204 N.W.2d 178 (1973). 
167. [d. at 163,204 N.W.2d at 179. 
168. [d. at 164, 204 N.W.2d at 179. 
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judgment, which, with costs, totalled $2,132.49. Otten appealed, 
assigning as error the trial court's dismissal of the cross-claim for 
damages. 
Again, the issue of retention arose within the context of an 
affirmative attempt to recover damages. In this case, however, unlike 
Harris, the evidence showed that the value of the collateral ($2,500) 
exceeded the amount of the debt ($1,898.64). The court remanded, 
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Otten on his cross-claim 
against the bank and Weiss in the amount of $601.36 with interest and 
costs from April 4, 1969. The effect of this decision was obviously 
indistinguishable from a finding that the debt had been extinguished by 
the unreasonable retention as a matter of law, coupled with a further 
finding of losses over and above the debt for which Otten was entitled 
to be compensated. 
The court's thinking in terms of Section 9-507(1) was spelled out. 
Furthermore, the court made it quite clear why it did not feel free to 
simply reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Weiss: 
Weiss obtained record title to the tractor and trailer as 
purchaser at the sheriff's sale under execution of the judgment 
on the note originally made to the bank. Otten did not deny 
that debt, and in this state of the record it is inappropriate to 
alter that judgment. 
The failure of the bank and Weiss to proceed in a reasonable 
time and manner to comply with the statutes with reference to 
disposition of the collateral resulted in a loss to Otten for which 
he is entitled to damages. This is consistent with recovery of 
loss provided for when there is failure to comply with the vee 
under the circumstances set out in ... [§ 9-507(1)] .169 
Looking first to the language of vee Section 9-504(3) and its 
requirement that reasonable notification be given "of the time after 
which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made," the 
court said: 
The other "intended disposition" in this section must include 
that mentioned in .. . [Vee § 9-505(2)], ... which permits a 
secured party in possession to propose to retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the obligation .... 
We believe the intent of these sections is that the secured 
creditor has two options-he may proceed initially to sell the 
property after giving the notice, etc. as provided by .. . [Vee 
§ 9-504( 3)] . . . or propose to retain the collateral in satisfac-
tion of the obligation .... A creditor who takes possession 
169. Id. at 170, 204 N.W.2d at 183. 
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under . .. [UCC § 9-504(3)J must pursue his claim under one 
of the above-described options, and failure so to do subjects 
him to damages. 170 
199 
The court then quoted extensively from Marston and Bradford, 
emphasizing that: 
The duty to make a disposition of the collateral within a 
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner is imposed on the 
secured party to require him to act diligently to protect the 
interests of the debtor. I 71 
The court specifically pointed out that any excuses of the creditors for 
their long failure to act 
[could not] be charged to Otten when he did nothing to 
prevent the enforcement of any rights under the security 
agreement. 172 
Coming to the crux of the matter (for purposes of guidance in our 
hypothetical case), the court turned to two of the leading cases 
expounding the Majority rule position that failure to give prior notice 
of intended disposition barred the secured creditor's recovery of a 
deficiency as a matter of law, Braswell v. American Nat 'I Bank!73 and 
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan,174 stating: 
We equate failure to give notice as required by law where a sale 
is held to be of the same legal effect as where the creditor 
retains possession of the property for an unreasonable time (as 
the bank and Weiss did here) and takes no proceeding to 
conduct a sale. The resulting damage to the debtor is the 
same. 175 
If retention of approximately fourteen months is so unreasonable as 
to extinguish the debt as a matter of law and bar the recovery of a 
deficiency, then should not the delay of eighteen months in our 
170. [d. at 165, 204 N.W.2d at 180 (emphasis added). 
171. [d. at 166, 204 N.W.2d at 181. 
172. [d. at 167, 204 N.W.2d at 181. 
173. 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420. 
174. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315. 
175. 87 S.D. at 168, 204 N.W.2d at 182. See also Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alas. 
1973) (secured party who retained truck for four months after repossession and used it 
in a manner inconsistent with its preservation before bringing suit, held to have retained 
the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness). But see People's Nat'l. Bank of 
Washington v. Peterson, 82 Wash. 2d 822, 514 P.2d 159 (1973), wherein the Supreme 
Court of Washington refused to find such an election when the debtor's attorney had 
requested the creditor bank to cancel a proposed public sale and the bank had acceded to 
this request. 
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hypothetical have the same effect? If the Lender had doubts about the 
value or collectibility of the receivables, should it not have hastened to 
seek to liquidate all of them by sale, even if it would be nothing more 
than a futile gesture, before bringing suit for the total deficiency? Its 
failure to do so might, arguably, support the inference that it never 
intended to do so, since it desired to retain the receivables in 
satisfaction of the obligation still outstanding after the sale of the brick 
inventory. Even if the Lender had some excuse for its failure to act a 
court might be unwilling to hold the Guarantor liable since, in the 
words of the Otten court, the Lender's "inaction should not be charged 
to [the guarantor herein] when [he] did nothing to prevent the 
enforcement of any rights under the security agreement. ,,176 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it would appear to be prudent 
for the secured party in possession of collateral following default to 
make a prompt decision, and to notify the debtor and any guarantor of 
its intention to retain or dispose of the collateral. Procrastination might 
take the matter out of the lender's hands and compel it, as a matter of 
law, to be satisfied with the collateral, the value of which might be 
SUbstantially lower than the amount of the outstanding indebtedness. 
CONCLUSION 
As the body of case law considered in this article attests, there are a 
number of pitfalls to catch the unwary secured creditor on the far side 
of default. Failure to comply with the provisions of Title Nine of the 
Code governing disposition of repossessed collateral on default can 
negate all of the foresight and business planning exercised at the 
inception of the transaction. In Maryland there is, perhaps, need for a 
somewhat higher degree of caution, since the Maryland Court of 
Appeals has yet to rule directly on most of the relevant issues. 
Consequently, there are no definitive answers to many of the questions 
posed herein, particularly with respect to the nature and extent of the 
consequences to be visited on the secured party for non-compliance. 
Fortunately, however, the burdens placed on the secured party by 
the Code are far from onerous so that, with competent legal advice and 
a measure of prudence, it is possible to obviate or substantially 
minimize the risks of non-compliance. Unless and until the Court of 
Appeals holds otherwise, the secured party would be best advised to 
regard any guarantor of the secured obligation as a debtor within the 
meaning of Section 9-504(3), entitled to receive the notice provided for 
therein. Similarly, the secured party should not unduly temporize with 
respect to the option provided by the Code to retain all or part of the 
collateral in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness, lest procrasti-
nation result in an unwelcome choice being imputed to it as a matter of 
176. 87 S.D. 167, 204 N.W.2d at 181. 
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law. Beyond this, nothing more is required of the secured party than 
that it act in good faith and with commercial reasonableness. 
If it complies with these requirements, the secured party can 
substantially reduce the risk of forfeiting its entitlement to a deficiency 
judgment against the guarantor, or of assuming the equally costly 
burden of rebutting a presumption that the value of the repossessed 
collateral is equal to the amount of the obligation. In short, the secured 
party has it within its power to avoid a walk on the wild side and, to 
the extent that it is possible to speak of it as such, assure that its walk is 
on the secure side of default. 
